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Contract law has progressed and evolved sounder principles since the days 
of ritualistic and formalistic sealed instrument requirements. 1 
I. SALES LAw AND THE CuRRENCY BAZAAR 
The cheerful evaluation of contract law by the Court of Appeals in 
V'Soske v. Barwick is stunningly naive. At least one important branch of 
contract law, sales law, may be ill-equipped to serve the needs of the mod-
ern international financial marketplace. In the global currency bazaar, 
banks, corporations, investors, and governments buy and sell foreign cur-
rency from one another. Their transactions are conducted on tenuous 
legal grounds.2 Fundamental issues of the scope of sales law and the en-
forceability of contracts are unresolved. 
Perhaps if the currency bazaar were economically insignificant it 
would not matter whether sales law served the needs of foreign exchange 
traders. This bazaar, however, is the world's largest financial market. At 
the end of an average day, roughly $1 trillion worth of currencies has 
changed hands.3 This figure represents a 35 percent increase in turnover 
in just three years (1989-92). 4 Hence, explosive growth, as well as enor-
mous size, is a salient feature of the bazaar. Moreover, the currency bazaar 
never closes.5 At any time of the day or night millions of U.S. dollars are 
I. V'Soske v. Barwick, 404 F.2d 495, 499 (2d Cir. I968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 92I 
(I969). 
2. For an overview of foreign exchange transactions, see Raj Bhala, Risk Trade-of!s in the 
Fcrreign Exchange Spot, Furward and Derivative Markets, I THE FINANCIER 34 (1994); RoGER M. 
KuBARYCH, FoREIGN ExcHANGE MARKETS IN THE UNITED STATES (rev'd. ed. I983). 
3. MoNETARY & EcoNOMIC DEP'T, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS (BASLE, SWITZERLAND), 
CENTRAL BANK SuRVEY OF FoREIGN ExCHANGE MARKET ACTIVITY IN APRIL I992 I, 5-6 (I993) 
[hereinafter, CENTRAL BANK SuRVEY]. In Apriii992, the total reported gross turnover in spot, 
forward, and derivative foreign exchange contracts was $1.354 trillion. (After correcting for 
double counting and estimated reporting gaps, the figure was $880 billion.) /d. at 6 tbl. I;·see 
also James Blitz, AU Change in Foreign Exchanges: The Nature of the International Currency Dealing 
Has Altered, FIN. TIMES (London), Apr. 2, I993, at I7. 
4. CENTRAL BANK SuRVEY, supra note 3, at 6 tbl. I. 
5. See Scott E. Pardee, Internationalization of Financial Markets, 72 EcoN. REv. (Federal 
Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Mo.), Feb. I987, .at 3, 3 (noting that "[i]n the I970s, foreigri 
exchange became a 24-hour market, with the major banks dealing with each other each day 
through their offices in the markets in the Far East (Tokyo, Hong Kong, Singapore) the 
Middle East (once Beirut, now Bahrain), then Europe (London, Frankfurt, Zurich), and 
finally, the United States (New York for interbank trading and Chicago for futures trad-
1994] GLOBAL CURRENCY BAZAAR 3 
traded for Japanese yen, millions of German marks are exchanged for 
French francs, millions of English pounds are sold against Swiss francs, 
and so forth.6 The buy and sell decisions of banks, businesses, and institu-
tional and individual investors establish exchange rates. In turn, the ex-
change rates critically influence the international flow of goods, services, 
and money. The currency bazaar is too big, growing too rapidly, and too 
important to the international economy to ignore. 
This important bazaar, however, has been ignored by legal scholars. 7 
Because foreign exchange trading raises fundamental contract issues, this 
neglect must end. A legal assessment of the needs of foreign exchange 
market participants is required, not only by the participants themselves, 
but also by judges and regulators who are trying to cope with a small but 
increasing number of breakdowns in foreign exchange trading. 
Of course the participants expect to find currency trading profitable; 
otherwise they would channel their resources into a different financial 
market. Yet, participants can no longer dismiss the breakdowns as isolated 
incidents in their race for profits. Formal adjudication results from mis-
haps that involve high monetary stakes; but when a bank, business, or in-
vestor goes to court or to a regulatory agency over a foreign exchange deal 
gone sour, they get little comfort. Judges and regulators are groping. 
They do not know whether to apply sales law to the transactions, and if so, 
which sales law should be used. Judges and regulators do not know 
whether the transactions are enforceable. Worst of all, they do not have a 
conceptual framework for dealing with these issues. 
This article attempts to fill the large and dangerous void in legal 
scholarship on foreign exchange transactions. It further seeks to provide 
a conceptual framework for judges and regulators that will help them re-
solve problems in the currency bazaar. It addresses two fundamental con-
tractual problems that arise in the currency bazaar under Article 2 of the 
ing.)"). Technically, the trading week begins in New Zealand on Monday morning at ap-
proximately 8 a.m. and ends in New York on Friday at approximately 5 p.m. While trading 
volumes are thin at other times, it remains possible to find counterparties with which to enter 
into foreign exchange transactions. 
6. The five most widely traded currencies are the dollar, mark, yen, pound, and Swiss 
franc. The percentage of turnover accounted for by these currencies are 82, 40, 23, 14, and 
9, respectively. CENTRAL BANK SuRVEY, supra note 3, at 9 tbl. ll(a). 
7. With the exception of a fifteen year-Qld student Note, law reviews are largely devoid 
of articles on commercial law problems associated with foreign exchange transactions. See 
Michael L. Manire, Note, Foreign Exchange Sales and the Law of Contracts: A Case For Analogy to 
the Unij07TTI Commercial Code, 35 V AND. L. REv. 1173 ( 1982). This Note asserts that Article 2 
should apply to foreign exchange transactions, yet provides no theoretical basis for the asser-
tion. See id. at 1174, 1188, 1192, 1200, 1206, and 1209. The Note fails to account for the 
highly significant fact that conversations between parties negotiating and concluding foreign 
exchange transactions typically are tape-recorded. It incorrectly suggests that all foreign ex-
change transactions are confirmed in writing; See id. at 1186-87. As page proofs of this arti-
cle were being prepared, a brief article on foreign exchange transactions and Article 2 
appeared. See Stephen C. Veltri, Should Foreign Exchange Be "Foreign • to Article Two of the Uni-
f07TT1 Commercial Code?, 27 CoRNELL INT'L LJ. 343 (1994). This welcome addition to the litera-
ture provides an excellent review of relevant pre-U.C.C. cases. It does not advocate a 
particular approach, like the pragmatic strategy argued for herein, to the issue of the scope 
of Article 2, nor does it dicuss the statute of frauds. 
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Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C."). First, should the scope of sales law 
cover foreign exchange? Second, should oral foreign exchange contracts 
be enforceable despite the statute of frauds? 
This article proposes that these questions be answered using a prag-
matic strategy which emphasizes the needs of foreign exchange market partici-
pants in relation to Article 2. The pragmatic strategy identifies an integral 
relationship between the problems of scope and enforceability in order to 
ensure that sales law does not impinge on the vitality and dynamism of the 
currency bazaar. Thus, according to this proposed strategy, the resolution 
of the first problem hinges critically on the outcome of the second 
problem. 
Courts and regulators have failed to cope adequately with the prob-
lem of scope. Courts have adopted a "carelessly inclusive" approach. Reg-
ulators, most notably the Federal Reserve,8 have used an "aggressively 
exclusive" approach. Instead, an examination of the key rules of Article 2 
in the context of the currency bazaar is needed before the problem can be 
resolved. The statute of frauds is such a rule. How it functions in the 
currency bazaar is a critical indicator of whether Article 2 should govern 
transactions in this bazaar. 
Currently, courts and regulators misguidedly adhere to what is best 
termed the "tangibility paradigm" -the fixation on a tangible document 
to satisfy the statute of frauds. The paradigm should be abandoned be-
cause it does not serve the needs of the currency bazaar. It is a strict ap-
proach to the problem of enforceability that clashes with the telephonic 
technology of the bazaar. It is also incongruous with the repeat-player, 
high-trust culture of the bazaar. Legislative amendments to, or a judicial 
re-interpretation of, the statute of frauds is needed. Unless these changes 
are made, the pragmatic strategy suggests foreign exchange transactions 
may be appropriately excluded from the scope of Article 2. In that event, 
other commercial laws, considered below, may be applicable.9 
By no means is the thesis advanced herein limited to the foreign ex-
change market. The underlying and general theoretical question is at 
what point is it appropriate to codify a market or industry? The foreign 
exchange market is a case study of this question. Recently, Professor Ray-
mond T. Nimmer set forth three criteria to determine when a market is 
ripe for codification: the area of the contract (i) achieves national scope 
(the nationality criterion); (ii) affects substantial commercial volume (the 
volume criterion), and (iii) would benefit from codification instead of 
common law governance (the relevance criterion).10 Because the prag-
matic strategy suggests that market needs must be examined, the strategy 
appears consistent with the relevance principle. Moreover, the foreign ex-
change market clearly satisfies the nationality and volume criteria. The 
8. Hereinafter, unless otherwise noted, the "Federal ReseiVe" refers to the Federal Re-
seiVe Bank of New York and the Board of Governors of the Federal ReseiVe System. 
9. See infra notes 218-235 and accompanying text. 
10. Raymond T. Nimmer, Intangibles Contracts: Thoughts of Huhs, Spokes, and Reinvigrr 
rating Anicle 2, 35 WM. & MARv L. REv. 1337, 1367-73 (1994). 
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problem then becomes one of the relative weight to be given to the crite-
ria. If two of Professor Nimmer's criteria are satisfied, is the conclusion in 
favor of codification inexorable? Not necessarily. The thesis herein sug-
gests that the relevance principle may be relatively more important than 
other criteria. We cannot rush to include or exclude foreign exchange 
from Article 2 until we have determined whether the statute "works" for 
the market. 
There are five remaining parts to this article. Part II sets up a hypo-
thetical but highly realistic foreign exchange transaction. The hypotheti-
cal transaction raises the issues of scope and enforceability, and it is used 
in parts III-V to advance the thesis of this article. 
Part III considers the scope issue, namely, whether foreign exchange 
should be a "good" within the ambit of Article 2. In part III, both the 
carelessly inclusive and aggressively exclusive approaches are rejected; but 
the pragmatic strategy, which centers on the relationship between contract 
enforceability rules and the needs of the currency bazaar, is advanced. 
Part IV applies the pragmatic strategy to the statute of frauds issue. 
This part highlights the clash between a formal legal approach to the stat-
ute of frauds on the one hand, and the way transactions are negotiated 
and concluded in the currency bazaar on the other hand. The argument 
rejects the tangibility paradigm and advocates changing the statute of 
frauds (either legislatively or judicially) to meet the needs of the market. 
Even though parts III and IV focus on the application of Article 2 to 
the hypothetical foreign exchange transaction, no shortage exists of other 
sales laws for judges to apply directly or by analogy. Accordingly, Part V 
extends the pragmatic strategy to three other potentially applicable sales 
law regimes: II first, the proposed revisions to Article 2 ("revised Article 
2"), which are presently under consideration by the National Conference 
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Law Insti-
tute;I2 second, the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the Inter-
national Sale of Goods ("CISG"), to which approximately 34 countries are 
Contracting States, including the U.S., China, France, Germany, Switzer-
land, Italy, Canada, and Australia;I 3 and third, private contract law, specifi-
11. The common law of contract is, of course, potentially applicable to disputes arising 
from foreign exchange transactions. However, there is no question of the scope of this legal 
regime; it purports to cover all contracts unless displaced by other law. There is not a com-
mon law statute of frauds for the sale of goods. 
12. U.C.C. REVISED ARTICLE 2, pts. 1-3, 7 {Tentative Draft Dec. 21. 1993) and pts. 1-6 
{Tentative Draft Sept. 10, 1993) [hereinafter, December 1993 Draft and September 1993 
Draft, respectively] {on file with author) and Uniform Commercial Code Revised Article 2. 
Sales {Draft july 29-Aug. 5, 1994) [hereinafter, August 1994 Draft] {on file with author). 
13. The United Nations Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 
Apr. 10, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 668 {Final act, entered into force Jan. 1, 1988) [hereinafter CISG]. 
Documents and summary records of the Conference appear in U.N. CoNFERENCE ON CoN-
TRAcrs FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF Goons, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/19, U.N. Sales No. 
E.82.V.5 {1981). The text of the Conference and reservations taken by Contracting States are 
reprinted in Selected International Conventions, 1994 MARTINDALE-HUBBLE INTERNATIONAL 
LAw DIGEST, pt. VII, at IC-29 [hereinafter MARTINDALE-HUBBLE]. The legislative history of the 
Senate advice and consent action is found at Proposed United Nations Convention on Contracts Jar 
the International Sale of Goods: Hearings on Treaty Doc. 98-9 &fore the Comm. on Fareign Relations, 
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cally, the International Foreign Exchange Master Agreement ("IFEMA") 
which is a standard-form contract devised recently by banks that actively 
trade foreign exchange.14 Part V argues that the IFEMA is unhelpful in 
resolving the statute of frauds problem because that contract lacks the es-
sential quantity term. Part V further argues that it may be appropriate to 
extend the scope of the CISG and revised Article 2 to cover foreign ex-
change transactions because these regimes omit a statute of frauds 
provision. 
Part VI synthesizes the arguments of Parts 111-V and draws conclusions 
from the application of the pragmatic strategy to the scope and enforce-
ability problems in the currency bazaar. 
II. THE HYPOTHETICAL SPOT TRANSACDON 
The foreign-exchange market is one of the world's slickest. It is 
screen-based, genuinely international and open for business 24 hours a 
day. There are many buyers and sellers; prices adjust rapidly and for the 
most part smoothly. And it is huge. 15 
United States Senate, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). A list of Contracting States is maintained by 
the Treaty Section, Office of Legal Affairs, United Nations. 
Curiously, even though the U.S. is a Contracting State, no court or commentator has 
considered the applicability of the CISG to foreign exchange transactions directly or by anal-
ogy. See, e.g., E. Allen Farnsworth, The V~enna Conventicm: Histury and Scope, 18 INT'L LAw. 17 
(1984); Alejandro M. Garro, Reccmciliaticm of Legal Traditions in the U.N. Conventicm on Con-
tracts for the lnternaticmal Sale of Goods, 23 INT'L LAw. 443 (1989); James E. Joseph, Contract 
Formation Under the United Nations Conventicm cm Contracts for the lnternaticmal Sale of Goods and 
the Uniform Commercial Code, 3 DICK. J. INT'L L. 107 (1984); Courtney P. Smart, Comment, 
Formation of Contracts in Louisiana Under the United Nations Conventicm for the /nternaticmal Sale of 
Goods, 53 LA. L. REv. 1339 (1993). 
14. See FoREIGN ExcHANGE CoMMITTEE, INTERNATIONAL FoREIGN ExCHANGE MAsTER 
AGREEMENT§ A (1993) [hereinafter IFEMA]. Even though the Foreign Exchange Commit-
tee first published the IFEMA in November 1993, it is already being used by foreign ex-
change market participants in New York, London, and Tokyo. It is not the only example of a 
privately-negotiated, standard-form written agreement in the global currency bazaar. In 
1992, the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) published a revised master 
agreement which can be tailored for use in spot foreign exchange transactions by altering 
the schedules to the agreement. FXNET, a London-based system for netting foreign ex-
change trades on a bilateral basis, has issued a Worldwide Agreement. 
The IFEMA, however, appears to have the brightest prospects for widespread adoption 
by spot market participants. In part, the IFEMA bears the informal imprimatur of the Fed-
eral Reserve. The Foreign Exchange Committee (specifically, the Financial Market Lawyers 
Group) drafted the IFEMA. This Committee advises and operates under the auspices of the 
Federal Reserve. See FoREIGN ExcHANGE CoMMITTEE, 1992 ANNUAL REPORT 5 ( 1993) [herein-
after FEC 1992]. In addition, the IFEMA reflects what seems to be commonly regarded as 
the best foreign exchange market practice. See FoREIGN EXCHANGE CoMMITTEE, GuiDE TO 
THE 1993 INTERNATIONAL FOREIGN EXCHANGE MAsTER AGREEMENT § C (1993) [hereinafter 
IFEMA GuiDE]; Ruth W. Ainslie, Foreign Exchange: The New Master Foreign Exchange 
Trading Agreements 1, (Apr. 20, 1994) (unpublished manuscript, presented at the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund Seminar on Current Legal Issues Affecting Central Banks, Washington, 
D.C., May 18, 1994, on file with the International Monetary Fund). 
15. The Last of the Good Times?, EcoNOMIST, Aug. 15, 1992, at 61. 
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A. The Basic Terms 
The most basic and common foreign exchange transaction is a spot. 16 
A spot contract involves a commitment by one party to deliver a specified 
quantity of one currency against another party's delivery of a specified 
quantity of a second currency. In effect, each party is buying one currency 
and paying for it with another currency. The date the commitment is 
made is the trade date. The value date, which is the date on which the 
reciprocal deliveries occur, is within two business days of the trade qate. 17 
For example, suppose on November 1 Citibank and the Development 
Bank of Singapore ("DBS") enter into a dollar-yen spot foreign-exchange 
transaction.18 Citibank agrees to buy 120 million yen from DBS in ex-
change for U.S. dollars at a price, or exchange rate, of 104 yen per dol-
lar.19 Hence, Citibank pays DBS $1,153,846.15 for the yen. Payment of 
the dollars, and the reciprocal yen payment, must occur on the value date, 
November 3. 
16. See CENTRAL BANK SuRVEY, supra note 3, at 16 ("The spot market is still the single 
most important segment of the foreign exchange market."). 
17. See id. at 16. Thus, in a spot foreign exchange transaction, the settlement of pay-
ment obligations is said to occur on "T+2" (where "T" stands for the trade date). Settlement 
occurs, however, on T +I in the spot markets for Mexican pesos and Canadian dollars. The 
analysis and arguments in this article are equally applicable to a forward foreign exchange 
transaction, i.e., one in which the value date is more than two days after the trade date. 
18. Citibank is a commercial bank headquartered in New York. DBS is a commercial 
and investment bank headquartered in Singapore. The parties are deliberately put in differ-
ent parts of the world not only to simulate real-world conditions but also to illustrate that 
trading in many different currencies occurs far away from the home countries of those 
currencies. 
Non-bank parties-such as corporations, institutional investors, individual investors, and 
governments (mainly central banks)-actively participate in the foreign exchange market. 
Inter-bank dealing, however, accounts for 70 percent of total market activity. See CENTRAL 
BANK SuRVEY, supra note 3, at 1, 11-12; Manire, supra note 7, at 1183. Of the transactions 
between interbank dealers, 41 percent are with dealers located abroad and 29 percent are 
with dealers in the same jurisdiction. CENTRAL BANK SuRVEY, supra note 3, at 11-12. 
19. In practice, exchange rates are quoted in more precise terms because finer move-
ments are observed that result in large profits and losses. The dollar-yen rate is quoted in 
terms of hundredths of yen per dollar. For example, the rate on Friday, April 15, 1994 was 
103.45 yen per dollar. Currency Trading-Exchange Rates," WALL ST.j., Apr. 18, 1994, at CIS. 
DBS need not actually possess 120 million yen at the time that it enters into a spot 
contract to sell yen. If it did not, it would be short selling-that is, selling foreign currency 
that is not held. For an example of selling 400 million pounds short against the dollar, see 
ANDREW J. KRIEGER, THE MoNEY BAZAAR: INSIDE THE TRILUON-Dou.AR WoRLD or CuRRENCY 
TRADING 65-79 (1992). IfDBS sells yen short, it will have to obtain 120 million yen to cover 
its short position before it is contractually obligated to deliver the yen to Citibank's desig-
nated account on the appropriate value date. 
DBS could cover its short position in a number of ways. First, it may take a long position 
in another spot transaction, for instance, buy yen in the spot market. DBS risks losing money 
if the spot rate for yen rises above 104 yen per dollar. Suppose the yen appreciates relative to 
the dollar to 103 yen per dollar. Then, DBS will have to buy 120 million yen at the market 
rate of 103 yen per dollar and sell them to Citibank at the previously agreed rate of 104 yen 
per dollar. The purchase will cost DBS $1,165,048.54, but the sale will fetch only 
$1,153,846.15, resulting in a loss of$11,202.39. Of course, DBS would not short sell yen if it 
thought yen would appreciate. It expects to profit by buying 120 million yen at, say, 107 yen 
per dollar and selling the yen at 105 yen per dollar. A second way for DBS to cover a short 
sale is to enter into a foreign currency option transaction. DBS could buy a call option on 
yen. This option would entitle DBS to obtain yen at a pre-set price. 
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B. Negotiating the Deal 
The dollar-yen spot agreement is reached between foreign exchange 
traders at Citibank and DBS through direct telephone negotiations.20 
The telephone conversations are tape recorded by each of the parties. 21 
Either Citibank or DBS may initiate the transaction. Assume a Citibank 
trader in New York calls a trader at DBS in Singapore. The Citibank 
trader asks for "a quote on dollar-yen," but does not necessarily indicate 
whether she intends to buy or sell yen.22 The custom in the foreign ex-
change market is to quote "two-way rates," i.e., both the bid and offer 
prices.23 The DBS trader does not learn the Citibank trader's intention 
until the Citibank trader proposes a specific trade.24 
Assume the DBS trader tells her counterpart at Citibank that the bid-
offer rates are "105-104."25 The Citibank trader indicates a desire to buy 
120 million yen. The DBS trader responds "120 million yen, yours, at 
104." At that juncture, according to the custom in the foreign exchange 
market, the traders believe a spot contract is established for the sale of 120 
million yen by DBS to Citibank at a price of 104 yen per dollar. Citibank is 
20. See RUDI WEISWEILLER, INTRODUcrJON TO fOREIGN ExCHANGE 14 (2d ed. 1984) (stat-
ing foreign exchange traders may transact by telephone); Thomas M. Campfield &John G. 
O'Brien, Fureign Exchange Trading Practices: The Interbank Market, in INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 
HANDBOOK§ 2.4, at 3 (Abraham M. George & Ian H. Giddy, eds., 1983) (noting "[m]odem 
sophisticated communications" like telephones link market participants). 
An alternative way for the Citibank and DBS traders to communicate directly is through 
an electronic messaging system. Such computer-to-computer communication requires the 
banks to be members of the same automated dealing system. The systems are sponsored by 
third-party vendors such as Reuters. About one-third of all foreign exchange deals are con-
cluded through these systems. See CENTRAL BANK SURVEY, supra note 3, at 21, 24. The effect 
of automated dealing on the resolution of the scope and enforceability problems is beyond 
the scope of this article. 
As an alternative to direct dealing, the Citibank and DBS traders might deal with each 
other indirectly through one or more foreign-exchange brokers who act as agents for their 
respective principals. See Bhala, supra note 2, at 100. Around one-third of all foreign ex-
change transactions between inter-bank dealers are arranged through brokers. See CENTRAL 
BANK SuRVEY, supra note 3, at 21 tbl. VI, 23-24. All telephone conversations between the 
traders and their respective brokers, and between the brokers, would be taped. Conse-
quently, the analysis presented herein is unaffected by the use of brokers. 
21. Tape recording the telephone conversations between foreign exchange traders is 
customary practice in the currency bazaar. Telephone interview with Philip Hemnell, Kim 
Eng Securities, New York, N.Y. (June 14, 1994). 
22. See KRIEGER, supra note 19, at 31. 
23. Because Citibank is willing to act as either a buyer or seller in any foreign exchange 
transaction, it contributes importantly to market liquidity. It will take either side of the spot 
deal. 
24. See KRIEGER, supra note 19, at 31. 
25. These rates are expressed in terms of number of yen per dollar. The bid price of 
105 yen per dollar reflects the exchange rate at which DBS is ready, willing, and able to buy 
yen. The offer (or asking) price of 104 yen per dollar reflects the rate at which DBS is ready, 
willing, ana able to sell yen. 
The difference of one yen per dollar between the bid and offer prices is the "spread." 
The bid price necessarily must be lower than the offer price. If it were not, then DBS would 
perpetually lose money. DBS would buy yen at a higher price and be forced to sell at a lower 
price. At the 105-104 rates, a 120 million yen transaction implies that DBS will pay 
$1,142,857.14 to buy the yen. The rates also imply that DBS will receive $1,153,846.15 from 
selling the yen. The spread assures that DBS can buy and re-5ell the yen for a profit of 
$10,989.01. 
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obligated to deliver $1,153,846.15 to DBS in two days. Conversely, DBS is 
obligated to deliver 120 million yen to Citibank in two days. The word 
"yours" is the magic trade term indicating entry into a spot contract.26 
After the traders conclude their conversation, each trader fills out a 
deal ticket. 27 The ticket states the name or initials of the trader, name of 
the counterparty, trade and value dates, type and amount of currency 
purchased, exchange rate, and payment (i.e., currency delivery) instruc-
tions. Citibank and DBS do not exchange deal tickets. Rather, the tickets 
are used by each bank for internal accounting and control purposes, for 
example, to monitor the total amounts of yen, dollars, marks, pounds, and 
other currencies bought and sold by the bank. 
In addition, Citibank and DBS might use the deal tickets as a basis for 
preparing written confirmations of the transaction. In many, but not nec-
essarily all, foreign exchange transactions, the parties exchange two confir-
mations.28 First, the traders exchange confirmations of the terms of the 
transaction by telex. Second, the operations departments of the respective 
parties exchange confirmations, usually by mail. 29 This article analyzes 
26. After the traders conclude the transaction, employees of the operations department 
of each bank may endeavor to confirm the terms of the transaction. Citibank's operations 
department may send a written confirmation of the transaction to the operations department 
at DBS, and vice versa. Each operations department may check the confirmation received 
with its own records of the transaction. These records will include the tape recording of the 
transaction, coupled with any written record. Naturally, the written confirmations should 
match the records of the deal. 
How do Citibank and DBS ascertain the designated account of the other to which the 
currencies must be delivered on the value date? The currencies are delivered to designated 
accounts of each bank. DBS will inform Citibank of its bank account name and number at 
which the dollars are to be delivered, and DBS will inform Citibank of the account name and 
number to which the yen must be transferred. The exchange of account information, or 
settlement instructions, may occur as part of the written confirmation process. Alternatively, 
assuming Citibank and DBS routinely trade with one another, they may have previously ex-
changed settlement instructions. Finally, Citibank and DBS may have signed a master agree-
ment such as the IFEMA and set forth settlement instructions therein. 
27. The telephone negotiation lasts only several seconds or a few minutes. In order to 
profit, foreign exchange traders must conclude transactions rapidly for two reasons. First, 
foreign exchange rates are volatile even in the short-term. The price quoted on a currency 
can move dramatically in seconds. If there is a delay in negotiating a transaction, then a 
prospective buyer or seller of a currency may elect not to proceed because exchange rates 
have changed such that the originally quoted rate is now an off-market rate, or no longer a 
rate at which the transaction would be profitable. 
Second, profits are generated by market participants like Citibank, DBS, and their bro-
kers by entering into a large volume of transactions. With respect to highly liquid currencies 
like the U.S. or Canadian dollar, Swiss or French franc, Japanese yen, German mark, and 
English pound, the bid-offer spread is small. Consequently, a large volume of purchase and 
sale transactions are necessary. A smaller number of high-risk trades, such as betting cor-
rectly against perceived market trends, are also a source of profits. Naturally, the pressure to 
conclude transactions rapidly makes oral negotiation by telephone an ideal means in the de-
centralized, global currency bazaar. 
28. Telephone interview with Philip Hemnell, Kim Eng Securities, New York, N.Y. Uune 
16, 1994). 
29. This department is also known as the "settlements department" or "back office." In 
addition to exchanging confirmations, the operations departments exchange payment in-
structions, usually by electronic means, through the Society for Worldwide Interbank Finan-
cial Telecommunications (SWIFT). 
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the case where Citibank and DBS do not exchange these confirmations, as 
well as the case where they are exchanged.3° 
C. The Dispute 
Shortly after the deal is concluded, the bid-ask spread moves from 
105-104 to 107-106 yen per dollar. The Citibank trader observes that as a 
result of short-term volatility, the financial asset (yen) she is buying has 
depreciated relative to the currency (dollars) in which she will render pay-
ment. Accordingly, she backs out of the deal with DBS and buys 120 mil-
lion yen from a third bank at the cheaper rate of 106 yen per dollar.31 In 
the meantime, the DBS trader has rejected offers from other banks to buy 
the yen. 
DBS learns of Citibank's unscrupulous action no later than the value 
date. At that point, DBS transfers 120 million yen to Citibank but does not 
receive the reciprocal payment of $1,153,846.15. The DBS trader insists 
on selling 120 million yen at the original exchange rate of 104 yen per 
dollar. Mter all, it relied on Citibank's oral representations and turned 
down other opportunities to sell the yen at this rate.32 Citibank refuses to 
go through with the transaction. 
Thus, DBS sues Citibank for breach of contract in the appropriate 
federal court. Citibank argues that U.C.C. Article 2 applies to the dispute 
and raises the affirmative defense that if there was a spot contract, then it 
is unenforceable under the statute of frauds set forth in section 2-201.33 
Because there is no signed writing to evidence the contract, Citibank ar-
gues, this statute is not satisfied. 34 DBS's response is that the scope of 
Article 2 of the U.C.C. does not encompass foreign exchange transactions, 
hence the statute of frauds is inapplicable. 
The thesis of this article implies that Citibank's defense should be 
rejected and, while DBS's response may have some merit, it too should be 
rejected. DBS's response is an over-reaction. The pragmatic strategy sug-
gests that whether foreign exchange transactions ought to fall within the 
scope of Article 2 depends on a comprehensive assessment of the provi-
sions of Article 2 in relation to the needs of foreign exchange market par-
30. For the case where confirmations are not exchanged, see infra notes 107-156 and 
accompanying text. For the case where confirmations are exchanged, see infra notes 167-216 
and accompanying text. 
31. At the cheaper rate, 120 million yen cost $1,132,075.41, as compared with 
$1,153,846.15 at the original rate ofl 04 yen per dollar. If the yen appreciated relative to the 
dollar, then a dispute could arise because DBS sought to renege on the deal with Citibank 
and sell 120 million yen at the new, higher market rate to a third party. 
32. Of course, it is not reliance that leads to the creation of a contract; there is a con-
tract here. Citibank and DBS have certain expectations that contract law is designed to pro-
tect regardless of the reliance factor. 
33. See U.C.C. § 2-201 (1990). Throughout this article, unless otherwise noted, the ref-
erences to the U.C.C. are to the 1990 Official Text, approved and published by the American 
Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Note 
that Citibank's defense raises the possibility of the judicial admissions exception to the stat-
ute of frauds. See U.C.C. § 2-201 (3) (b). This issue is not addressed herein. 
34. Citibank does not dispute that a contract was formed. Cf U.C.C. § 2-204(1) (stating 
that a contract may be made in any manner, including conduct by the parties). 
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tiCipants. Examining the statute of frauds in relation to these needs is an 
important part of this assessment. The results of the examination, how-
ever, cannot be dispositive because there is obviously more to Article 2 
than section 2-201. Citibank's defense should be rejected, and the con-
tract enforced, because the statute of frauds does not meet the needs of 
market participants. The statute should be modified or reinterpreted to 
conform with these needs. 
III. ScoPE-SHOULD FoREIGN ExcHANGE BE A "Gooo"? 
Without question the [Uniform Commercial] [C]ode was designed to 
bring the body of commercial law into the contemporary world of busi-
ness. . . . Its principal purpose was to meet the contemporary needs of a 
fast moving commercial society. 35 
The wisdom of the General Electric Credit decision is lost on courts and 
regulators struggling with problems in the currency bazaar. Courts and 
regulators understand that sales law is needed to establish precisely the 
rights and obligations of Citibank and DBS in the dollar-yen spot transac-
tion. Yet, these decision-makers employ conventional, sequential reason-
ing to the dispute: first, decide the scope of U.C.C. Article 2; second, 
consider the enforceability of the contract under section 2-201. Thus, un-
til the scope of sales law is clear, the risks of engaging in spot transactions 
cannot be allocated with precision. 
In their haste to establish rights and duties, courts take a carelessly 
inclusive approach to the scope issue. Regulators, in contrast, take an ag-
gressively exclusive approach. Both approaches are imprudent. The prag-
matic strategy says the conventional, sequential reasoning is rigid. Courts 
and regulators should first determine if Article 2 works for the currency 
bazaar; in the words of General Electric Credit, does it meet the "contempo-
rary needs of a fast moving" market?36 Only then should courts and regu-
lators consider whether the scope of Article 2 ought to include 
transactions in that bazaar. 37 
A. The Carelessly Inclusive Approach 
Many courts fail to discuss adequately why U.C.C. Article 2 governs 
transactions in the currency bazaar. They assume it applies, but provide 
scant analysis of the language of Article 2 to support this assumption. 
Courts disregard the implications to the foreign exchange market of ap-
plying Article 2 to spot transactions. 
35. General Electric Credit Corp. v. R.A. Heintz Construction Co., 302 F. Supp. 958, 967-
8 (D. Or. 1969). 
36. ld. at 968. 
37. A short-<ut solution to the problem of scope would be to rely on the first clause of 
U.C.C § 2-102 which states, "[u]nless the context otherwise requires." It could be argued that 
even if foreign exchange is not a "good," the context mandates the application of Article 2 to 
foreign exchange transactions. 
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1. The Five Careless Courts 
No fewer than five decisions adopt this carelessly inclusive approach 
to the problem of applying U.C.C. Article 2 to foreign exchange transac-
tions. Consider the opinion of a New York appellate court in United Equi-
ties Co. v. First National City Bank. 38 The court decided a claim arising from 
a dollar-yen forward foreign exchange transaction.39 The parties did not 
dispute the applicability of Article 2. The court nonchalantly applied Arti-
cle 2 without considering whether the transaction involved the sale of 
"goods."40 
In Saboundjian v. Bank Audi (USA), a New York appellate court again 
neglected to explore carefully the reason Article 2 applies to foreign ex-
change transactions.41 There, a bank failed to execute an oral foreign 
exchange order from its customer who unreasonably declined to mitigate 
his damages. The court asserted that "[t]he Uniform Commercial Code is 
applicable to foreign exchange transactions, since 'the Code excludes 
"money" only when it is a medium of payment, not when treated as a com-
modity.' "42 The decision provided no theory for a distinction between 
money as the subject of a contract and money as the medium of payment. 
In Intershoe, Inc. v. Bankers Trust Co., the New York Court of Appeals 
considered whether a written confirmation slip of a foreign exchange 
transaction is the final expression of the parties' agreement for purposes 
of the parol evidence rule.43 The court baldly stated: "[t]here seems to 
be no question that the UCC applies to foreign currency transactions."44 
In Compania Sud-Americana de Vapores, S.A. v. IBJ Schroder Bank & Trust Co., 
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York uncritically 
relied on the Intershoe decision and applied the Article 2 parol evidence 
rule to disputed foreign currency conversions.45 
Finally, in Koreag v. Refco FIX Associates, Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit provided only a sketchy overview of the meaning of 
"goods" under section 2-105. This overview justified the court's applica-
tion of Article 2 to foreign exchange transactions between a New York 
corporation, Refco, and a Swiss bank, Mebco. The court granted Refco, as 
the seller of U.S. dollars, a right to reclaim the dollars from Mebco, an 
38. 383 N.Y.S.2d 6 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976), aff'd, 395 N.Y.S.2d 640 (N.Y. 1977). 
39. United Equities entered into a contract on April 12, 1971 for the purchase of 360 
million yen against $1,018,710. Under the six-month foJWard contract, the yen were to be 
delivered on Oct. 14, 1971. Between the trade and value dates the Japanese government 
declared that non-residents could not open a yen-denominated bank account if they did not 
already have one before Sept. 6, 1971. United Equities lacked such an account, and thus it 
was unable to receive delivery of the yen. 383 N.Y.S.2d at 7-8. See also discussion regarding 
foJWard transactions supra note 17. 
40. See United Equities, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 9-13; cf. U.C.C. §§ 2-102 and 2-105(1) (discussing 
the scope of the Article and definition of "goods," respectively). 
41. 556 N.Y.S.2d 258 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990). 
42. /d. at 262 n.2 (citing New York Annotations to U.C.C. § 2-105 at 97). 
43. 568 N.Y.S.2d 333 (N.Y. 1991); see also Steven Lipin, Bankers Trust Wins Suit on Currency 
Deal, AM. BANKER, Apr. 2, 1991, at 2. The facts of lntershoe are discussed infra note 193. 
44. Intershoe, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 336 (citations omitted). 
45. 785 F. Supp. 411, 431 (1992) [hereinafter IB]l. The facts of /Bjare discussed infra 
note 202. 
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insolvent buyer.46 The court failed to consider whether this remedy is in-
consistent with other provisions of the U.C.C., namely, the receiver finality 
rule of Article 4A.47 
Perhaps these courts carelessly applied Article 2 to foreign exchange 
transactions because the official commentary thereto sometimes invites ap-
plication by analogy. Official comment 1 to section 2-105 states that while 
investment securities are expressly excluded from the scope of Article 2, 
[i]t is not intended by this exclusion ... to prevent the applica-
tion of a particular section of this Article by analogy to securities 
... when the reason of that section makes such application sensi-
ble and the situation is not covered by the Article of this Act deal-
ing specifically with such securities (Article 8).48 
Judges may reason that even if they are incorrect as a matter of law about 
the scope of Article 2, the statute encourages courts to apply it where ap-
propriate by analogy. 
Such reasoning is specious. There is no such invitation issued by the 
official commentary to judges adjudicating cases involving foreign cur-
rency. Moreover, direct application provides parties with the certainty 
that the entire statute governs. In contrast, application by analogy empow-
ers the court to pick and choose among the provisions of Article 2. Selec-
tive application breeds uncertainty. 
46. 961 F.2d 341, 356 (2nd Cir. 1992). In Koreag, Refco engaged in two types of spot 
foreign exchange transactions with Mebco. First, Refco bought foreign currency from 
Mebco for $7.4 million U.S. dollars. On April 28, 1989, Refco transferred $7.4 million by 
wire to Mebco. Second, Refco sold $4.1 million worth of foreign currencies to Mebco in 
exchange for U.S. dollars. Between April 28 and May 2, 1989, Refco transferred these cur-
rencies by wire to Mebco. Mebco, however, was declared insolvent and closed by the Swiss 
bank regulatory authority on April 27, 1989. The closure occurred before Mebco transferred 
the foreign currencies Refco had bought for $7.4 million, and before Mebco paid Refco for 
the $4.1 million in foreign currencies. Refco sought to reclaim the $7.4 million and the 
foreign currencies it had transferred to Mebco. /d. at 344-46. 
With respect to the first type of transaction, the court found that Refco was a seller of 
U.S. dollars and, therefore, was entitled to reclaim the foreign currencies-the "goods"-
under U.C.C. §§ 2-310(a), 2-507(2), and 2-702(2). /d. at 355-56. Sections 2-310(a) and 2-
507(2) are relevant if the foreign exchange transaction is considered a cash sale. U.C.C. § 2-
310(a) provides that "[u)nless otherwise agreed, payment is due at the time and place at 
which the buyer is to receive the goods ... ." Section 2-507 (2) indicates that " [ w) here pay-
ment is due and demanded on the delivery to the buyer of goods ... , [the buyer's] right as 
against the seller to retain or dispose of them is conditional upon his making the payment 
due." The Koreag court found the interaction of these two sections "to create a seller's right 
to reclaim goods from an insolvent buyer who takes possession of the goods, but fails to 
tender payment" [citations omitted). 961 F.2d at 356. Section 2-702(2) is relevant if the 
transaction is considered a credit sale. The existence of a seller's right of reclamation in the 
case of a credit sale is clear from the statutory language;§ 2-702(2) states, "[w]here the seller 
discovers that the buyer has received goods on credit while insolvent he may reclaim the 
goods upon demand made within ten days after [their) receipt" See also infra note 74. 
With respect to the second type of transaction, the court stated that Refco was a buyer of 
U.S. dollars and, therefore, Article 2 did not provide a right equivalent to reclamation. 
Koreaq, 961 F.2d at 357. 
47. See infra note 74. 
48. U.C.C. § 2-105 cmt 1; see al.so B.N.E., Swedbank, S.A. v. Banker, 1993 U.S. Dist. Lexis 
2699 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 1993) (applying the parol evidence rule of§ 2-202 in a case involving 
transactions in debt securities of less developed countries). 
14 DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:1 
The failure of the five courts to assess carefully the scope of Article 2 
cannot be tolerated because the stakes in the trillion-dollar-a-day currency 
bazaar are high. A plenary extension of Article 2 to the currency bazaar 
must be accompanied by a close reading of the relevant scope provisions 
of Article 2. Such a reading suggests the issue is more complex and subtle 
than the courts have acknowledged, and that non-conventional reasoning 
is needed. 
2. Statutory Ambiguity 
The first and most important point to acknowledge is that the lan-
guage of U.C.C. Article 2 does not clearly indicate whether a foreign ex-
change transaction is included within its coverage. The starting point is 
section 2-102, which provides that Article 2 applies to "transactions in 
goods." Nowhere in Article 2 is "transaction" defined.49 Surely the 
purchase of yen and sale of dollars by Citibank qualifies as a "transaction" 
as distinct from a "security transaction" governed by Article 9.50 More-
over, the Citibank-DBS deal entails neither the provision of a seiVice nor a 
lease of currency. 
The lack of such complications has an important repercussion. The 
common law has developed the "essence" or "predominant factor" test for 
deciding whether hybrid contracts and sale-lease deals are subject to Arti-
cle 2.51 Problems in deciding whether to apply Article 2 to a hybrid sale-
seiVice contract, or categorizing a transaction as a sale governed by Article 
2 or a lease governed by Article 2A, do not exist with respect to foreign 
exchange transactions.52 Accordingly, the well-developed commercial law 
jurisprudence on these matters is inapposite. Similarly, frequently used 
treatises are unhelpful because they dwell on hybrid contracts and sale-
lease agreements.53 In the currency bazaar, an entirely new approach to 
the scope of Article 2, such as the pragmatic strategy advocated herein, is 
needed. 
The crux of the scope problem, as the Koreag court acknowledged, is 
that the subject of a spot foreign exchange transaction (a currency issued 
49. There are hints in Article 2 that the drafters meant that a "transaction" is a "sale." 
For example, U.C.C. § 2-101 provides that the title of Article 2 is "[s]ales." Section 2-106(1) 
indicates that a "contract" or "agreement" refer to a "sale of goods." Many sections of Article 
2 refer to a buyer and seller. Nevertheless, it is curious that the drafters chose the word 
"transaction" in § 2-102 instead of "sale." · 
50. See U.C.C. § 9-102. U.C.C. § 2-102 and the official comment thereto make clear that 
a "transaction" does not include a security transaction. 
51. This judicially-created test asks whether the sale of a good was the essence of the 
contract, or the predominant factor in the transaction, or whether it was merely incidental or 
collateral to the provision of a service, sale of real estate, or a lease arrangement. See, e.g., 
Triangle Underwriters v. Honeywell, 604 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding that the essence of 
a contract was the sale of goods and the provision of services was merely incidental to that 
sale); Bonebrake v. Cox, 499 F.2d 951 (8th Cir. 1974) (discussing the predominant factor 
test). 
52. For a discussion of these problems, see Note, Disengaging Sales Law from the Sale Con-
struct: A Proposal to Extend the Scope of Arlicle 2 of the UCC, 96 HAR.v. L. REv. 470 (1982). 
53. See, e.g.,jAMESJ. WHITE & RoBERTS. SuMMERS, UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CoDE§ 1-1 at 
25-26 (3rd ed. 1988) [hereinafter WHITE AND SuMMERS]. 
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by the United States, foreign country, or internationally recognized eco-
nomic zone54) is not necessarily a "good."55 According to section 2-
105(1}, "goods" are "all things ... which are 1TWVableat the time of identifi-
cation to the contract for sale other than the money in which the price is to be 
paid . .. and things in action."56 Movability is central to the concept of a 
"good."57 Undoubtedly, foreign exchange in the form of physical cur-
rency is movable. 58 On the value date, Citibank is entitled to receive deliv-
ery of 120 million yen in physical currency, and DBS is entitled to get 
$1,153,846.15 in physical currency. The yen and dollar notes could be 
shipped to the respective parties. 
In practice, however, participants in the foreign exchange market-
in contrast to a tourist buying foreign currency-do not receive physical 
delivery of cash. Foreign exchange is transferred from a seller to buyer by 
a funds (or wire) transfer.59 A 120 million debit in yen is entered elec-
tronically to the bank account of DBS, and a corresponding credit is en-
tered to Citibank's bank account. A debit of $1,153,846.15 is made to 
Citibank's bank account and a credit of that amount is made to the bank 
account of DBS. The transfer of yen and dollars around the world occurs 
in seconds. Thus, buying foreign exchange in the interbank market typi-
cally involves buying a bank balance, or bank deposit obligation, denomi-
nated in a foreign currency.60 
54. There is an active spot market for the European Union's European Currency Unit 
(ECU); thus, it would be incomplete to think only in terms of currency issued by individual 
sovereign nations. 
55. 961 F.2d 341, 355 ("[a]s a threshold matter, therefore, it must be determined 
whether the foreign currencies that Refco and Mebco agreed to exchange were 'goods' 
within the meaning of section 2-102."). 
56. U.C.C. § 2-105(1) (emphasis added). Identification of goods occurs when the con-
tract is made if, as in the hypothetical foreign exchange transaction, it is for the sale of goods 
already existing and identified. U.C.C. § 2-501(1)(a); see also infra note 60. "Money" is de-
fined in U.C.C. § 1-201 (24) as "a medium of exchange authorized or adopted by a domestic 
or foreign government as part of its currency." Thus, money is not narrowly viewed as legal 
tender, but rather that which has the sanction of government. U.C.C. § 1-201 cmt. 24. 
57. U.C.C. § 2-105 official cmt. l. 
58. Man ire, supra note 7, at 1193, 1196 (erroneously stating that foreign exchange trans-
ferred through banking channels-by which he presumably means wire transfer-is not 
moveable). See also infra note 59 and accompanying text. 
59. Funds transfers are more commonly known as "wire transfers." See generaUy Ernest T. 
Patrikis, Thomas C. Baxter, Jr., and Raj Bhala, Article 4A: The New Law of Funds Transfers and 
the Role ofCounse~ 23 UCC LJ. 219 (1990) (discussing U.C.C. Article 4A, which governs funds 
transfers, and other relevant laws, regulations, and private rules). 
60. See GLENN G. MUNN, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BANKING AND FINANCE 401 (F.L. Garcia ed., 
8th ed. 1983). Foreign exchange transactions "are more accurately described as the transfer-
ring by individuals or corporations in one country of credits or debits through their banks by 
obtaining credits or debits on the books of the banks in other countries that are correspon-
dents or branches of the banks through which the transmission is arranged." /d. 
An interesting question is whether foreign exchange is identified to the contract. The 
definition of "goods" in U.C.C. § 2-105(1) indicates that the thing is movable "at the time of 
identification to the contract for sale." Trading foreign exchange entails entering debits and 
credits electronically to bank accounts maintained on computers. In a traditional sense-a 
tangibility paradigm-identification might mean that the buyer of foreign exchange with-
draws the funds purchased, handles the physical currency, and re-deposits this currency. Ar-
guably, if foreign exchange is not identified to the contract because of its intangible, 
electronic nature, then it cannot be a "good" for purposes of Article 2. 
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Are movable funds like yen and dollars the "money in which the price 
is to be paid" and, therefore, excluded from being "goods"? The official 
comment to section 2-105 indicates that foreign currency is not automati-
cally excluded by this phrase: 
The exclusion of "money in which the price is to be paid" from 
the definition of goods does not mean that foreign currency 
which is included in the definition of money may not be the sub-
ject matter of a sales transaction. Goods is intended to cover the 
sale of money when money is being treated as a commodity but 
not to include it when money is the medium of payment.61 
The official comment suggests that every foreign exchange transaction 
consists of two legs, a "commodity leg" and a "payment leg." The Practice 
Commentary to New York's codification of the definition of "goods" rein-
forces the bifurcation: " 'money', other than the money in which the 
price is to be paid, is included in the definition of 'goods': thus a contract 
for sale of coins or of foreign currency is a contract for sale of goods."62 
Citibank buys yen and pays dollars. The transfer of yen is the "com-
modity leg," while the transfer of dollars is the "payment leg." From DBS's 
perspective as a buyer,63 the situation is the reverse: it buys dollars with 
yen, thus the dollar transfer is the commodity leg and the yen transfer is 
the payments leg. If both parties are viewed as buyers, then there is an 
inconsistency in the legs. Accordingly, one party must be viewed as a 
seller.64 DBS, for example, sells yen and receives dollars for the sale. 
Then, the commodity leg from both parties' perspective is the yen trans-
fer, and the payment leg is dollars.65 
Nevertheless, the movable yen in the commodity leg may be excluded 
from the U.C.C. section 2-105(1) definition because the yen are "things in 
action." The Intershoeand Koreagcourts neglect to consider this possibility. 
Those courts read the definition of "goods" in U .C. C. section 2-105 as if it 
stopped with the phrase "other than the money in which the price is to be 
paid." A "thing in action" is not defined in Article 2. It "denotes a claim 
or right to personal property not in one's possession, as distinguished 
from property actually in one's possession. "66 The factual predicate for 
61. U.C.C. § 2-105 cmt. I (emphasis added). 
62. N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-105 Practice Commentary note 2 (McKinney 1964) (emphasis 
added). 
63. A "buyer" is "a person who buys or contracts to buy goods." U.C.C. § 2-103(l)(a) 
(1989). 
64. A "seller" is "a person who sells or contracts to sell goods." /d.§ 2-103(l)(d). 
65. It is not strictly necessary for the transaction to have a purchase price in money in 
order to be governed by Article 2. U.C.C. § 2-304(1) addresses barter transactions, i.e., situa-
tions where a good is paid for with something other than money. The purchase price "can 
be m!ide payable in money or otherwise." U.C.C. § 2-304(1). Because the word "otherwise" 
includes any form of consideration sufficient to support a contract, it covers foreign cur-
rency. See, e.g., Mortimer B. Burnside & Co. v. Havener Sec. Corp., 269 N.Y.S. 724, 726 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1966). However, viewing the dollar-yen spot transaction as barter instead of a 
purchase of yen with money (namely, dollars), or a purchase of dollars with money (namely, 
yen) would be inappropriate because both dollars and yen are "money" as defined in U.C.C. 
§ 1-201 (24). See supra note 56. 
66. GLENN G. MUNN ET AL., ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BANKING AND FINANCE 181 (9th ed. 1991). 
The above-quoted definition concerns a "chose" in action which is the same as a "thing" in 
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classifying yen as a thing in action is intimated above. Citibank is buying a 
bank credit (an intangible, electronic bank balance, not physical cur-
rency) denominated in yen.67 As one court put it, "[e]ven when the obli-
gation is performed and the credit established, the customer is only the 
owner of an obligation or chose in action and not of any actual foreign 
money."68 
The rationale in two pre-U.C.C. cases seems to contemplate the dis-
tinction between physical currency and things in action. In the 1922 case 
of Melzer v. Zimmerman, a New York Supreme Court considered whether 
the sale of Austrian currency, kronen, was governed by New York's Per-
sonal Property Law ("PPL") as a sale of goods.69 The contract called for 
delivery of physical currency to the buyer. The court stated the contract in 
dispute "was an agreement for the purchase by the plaintiff and a sale by 
the defendant over the counter of said Austrian kronen in the form of 
currency, and not a deposit account payable by such a draft."70 Accord-
ingly, the contract fell within the ambit of the PPL. Similarly, in a 1925 
case, Zimmerman v. Roessler & Hasslacher Chemical Co.,71 a New York appel-
late court considered whether a contract for the sale of marks involved 
"goods" under New York's former Sales of Goods Act. The court observed 
that the contract contemplated the delivery of marks, not the credit of 
marks to a bank account, because the parties did not specify a time or 
action. A "chose in action" is defined in a manner similar to the meaning of a "thing in 
action," namely, as "a right of bringing an action or right to recover a debt or money." 
BucK's LAw DicnONARY 241, 1479 (6th ed. 1990). Moreover, "chose" is the French word for 
"thing." The drafters of the U.C.C. undoubtedly sought to simplify and modemi:ze terminol-
ogy. See U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(a). "Things in action" are discussed in Alphonse M. Squillante, 
Commercial Code Review, 76 CoM. LJ. 42 (1971). 
67. See Manire, supra note 7, at 1192 (concluding that foreign exchange transactions 
involve the sale of choses in action). Indeed, in 1955 the New York Law Revision Commis-
sion stated in its study of the Uniform Commercial Code that: 
The more limited exclusion of "the money in which the price is to be paid" is 
designed to permit the Sales Article to govern a transaction when, in the language 
of Comment 1, "money is being treated as a commodity": a sale of an ancient Ro-
man coin or a modem coin collection. This leads one on the question whether the 
Sales Article reaches a transaction for the exchange of dollars into pounds or pesos. 
Comment 1 (fourth paragraph) contains language which supports such coverage. 
But the provisions of the Sales Article hardly seemed designed to cope with foreign 
exchange transactions; perhaps they would be excluded from the article on the 
ground that they do not involve "things ... movable" or in any event are "things in 
action". [sic] 
1 STATE OF NEW YoRK, REPORT OF THE LAw REVISION CoMMISSION, STUDY OF THE UNIFORM 
CoMMERCIAL ConE 362 (1955). 
68. Samuels v. E.F. Drew & Co., 296 F. 882, 886 (2d Cir. 1924); see also Manire, supra 
note 7, at 1192 n.138 (citing other relevant cases). Of course, even if a court decides foreign 
exchange is a chose in action, it may well apply Article 2 by analogy. See, e.g., Zamore v. 
Whitten, 395 A.2d 435 (Me. 1978) (applying the U.C.C. by analogy to a sale of a chose in 
action) overruled by Bahre v. Pearl, 595 A.2d 1027 (Me. 1991 ). For scholarly treatments of the 
application of the U.C.C. by analogy, see Jane P. Mallor, Utility "Services" under the Uniform 
Commercial Code: Are Public Utilities in For a ShocH, 56 NoTRE DAME LAw. 89 ( 1980); Daniel E. 
Murray, Under the Spreading Analogy of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 39 FoRDHAM L. 
REv. 447 (1971). 
69. 194 N.Y.S. 222, 223-24 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1922), aff'd, 198 N.Y.S. 932 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1923). The Melzer court relied on an 1847 decision, Peabody v. Speyers, 56 N.Y. 230 (1874). 
70. Melzer, 194 N.Y.S. at 223. 
71. 207 N.Y.S. 370 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dept.), aff'd, 148 N.E. 659 (1925). 
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bank account for such a credit. Accordingly, the contract was held to in-
volve "goods. "72 
The concept of "things in action" and pre-U.C.C. cases suggest that 
the distinction between (1) a bank credit denominated in foreign cur-
rency; and (2) physical currency; should determine whether yen (or any 
other foreign currency) is a "good" under U.C.C. section 2-105(1). For-
eign currency-denominated bank credits are "things in action." Such 
credits are rights to the payment of money, and these rights, which may be 
bought and sold in the market, are excluded from Article 2. The support-
ing logic is a strict interpretation of "goods": Article 2 applies only to para-
digmatic goods, which in effect are tangible items, not to transfers of 
intangible interests such as interests in deposit accounts. 
This distinction should not be dismissed lightly. An ill-considered ex-
pansion of Article 2 to include purchases and sales of bank credits would 
open the door to the inclusion of transfers of claims against insurers, cor-
porate debt (to the extent not covered by U.C.C. Article 8), and accounts 
receivable (to the extent not governed by U.C.C. Article 9). The reach of 
Article 2 would extend to a far broader array of commercial and financial 
transactions than its drafters ever envisioned, and the provisions of Article 
2 might be ill-suited to the needs of the many and varied transactors. Nev-
ertheless, for the reasons discussed below, the distinction and supporting 
logic are problematic. 73 
B. The Aggressively Exclusive Approach 
The leading advocate of the aggressively exclusive approach is the 
Federal Reserve. For over two years it has acted through the Subcommit-
tee on Payments (Subcommittee) of the American Bar Association's Com-
mittee on the Uniform Commercial Code and urged the Subcommittee to 
adopt a report calling for the exclusion of foreign exchange transactions 
from the scope of U.C.C. Article 2.74 The Federal Reserve's position suf-
fers from four serious flaws. 
72. 207 N.Y.S. at 371-72. 
73. See infra notes 75-82 and accompanying text. 
74. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas C. Baxter, Jr., Deputy General Counsel and Senior Vice 
President, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, to Members of the Subcommittee on Payments 
(Mar. 30, 1994) and the accompanying Outline of Report of Subcommittee on Payments Concerning 
the Application of the Uniform Commercial Code to a Foreign Exchange Trade 2-7 (discussion draft, 
on file with author); Letter from Thomas C. Baxter, Jr., Counsel, Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York, to Members of the Subcommittee on Payments (Sept. 29, 1993) and the accompa-
nying Outline of Report of Subcommittee on Payments Concerning the Application of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code to a Foreign Exchange Trade 2-4,9-10 (second discussion draft, on file with author). 
See generally Thomas C. Baxter, Jr. & James H. Freis, Jr., Resolving Funds Transfer Disputes Re-
lated to Currency Exchange Transactions: What Law Guverns?, CoM. L. ANN. (forthcoming). 
The key reason for the Federal Reserve's position is a fear that if such transactions are 
subject to Article 2, then the receiver finality rule of Article 4A of the U.C.C. will be under-
mined. Section 4A-405(c) provides that a funds transfer is final and irrevocable upon accept-
ance of a payment order by the beneficiary's bank on behalf of the beneficiary. U .C.C. § 4A-
405(c), 2B U.L.A. 532 (1991). Thus, for example, when DBS's bank accepts dollars on be-
half of DBS, the credit of dollars to the DBS account is final. The fear arises from the conclu-
sion that under§§ 2-310(a), 2-507(2), and 2-702(2), a seller offoreign currency has a right to 
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1. The Stalemate of Pre-U.C.C. Cases 
The position relies on outdated, pre-U.C.C. cases-Melzerand Zimmer-
man-for guidance in resolving modern-day international commercial 
and financial problems. The Melzer and Zimmerman courts were not faced 
with a large and rapidly growing global currency bazaar. These courts fo-
cused on the difference between accepting physical delivery of currency 
and a deposit account denominated in foreign currency payable by a draft 
drawn on a foreign correspondent bank.75 This distinction is arcane inso-
far as foreign exchange typically moves from seller to buyer by funds 
transfer. 
Furthermore, there are pre-U .C. C. cases that plainly support the 
proposition that a foreign exchange transaction involves the sale of a 
"good" or commodity. Three such cases, Reisfeld v. ]acobs,76 Liepman v. 
reclaim currency from a buyer under certain circumstances. See Koreag v. Refco F /X Associ-
ates, Inc., 961 F.2d at 356. 
The Federal Reserve's fear, however, is unfounded. To say that the payment of the dol-
lar or yen leg of the transaction between Citibank and DBS is final for purposes of funds 
transfer law is one matter. To say that the seller of the currency at issue has a right to reclaim 
under sales law is a separate matter. There is no inconsistency between the two statements; 
rather, they simply reflect different legal effects of certain actions. See Letter from Patricia B. 
Fry, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, University of North Dakota 
School of Law, to Raj Bhala, Assistant Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law (Nov. 
2, 1993) with attached draft letter from Patricia B. Fry to Thomas C. Baxter, Jr., Deputy 
General Counsel, Federal Reserve Bank of New York 2-4 (on file with author). 
The Federal Reserve's concern that Kureag conflicts with Donmar Enter., Inc. v. South-
ern Nat'! Bank of N. Carolina, 828 F. Supp. 1230 (W.D.N.C. 1993) is also unfounded. See 
Letter from Thomas C. Baxter, Jr., Chairman and Deputy General Counsel, Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York, to Members of the Subcommittee on Payments (Oct. 18, 1993) (on file 
with author) (stating that Donmar "adds fuel to the fire because it seems to conflict with 
Kureag'). In Donmar, the plaintiff bought 280,000 pounds from Stephen's Trading Corpora-
tion ("STC") for $540,680. The plaintiff transferred by wire the U.S. dollars in two install-
ments, the second one in the amount of roughly $524,000, to the Southern National Bank 
(SNB). STC received this sum and, in turn, transferred it to a third party. When STC in-
structed SNB to pay 200,000 pounds to the plaintiff, SNB informed STC that STC's account 
lacked 200,000 pounds to make the payment. SNB informed the plaintiff of the insuffi-
ciency, and the plaintiff sought to recover the $524,000 it had paid to STC. 828 F. Supp. at 
1233-34. 
The Federal Reserve's fear of an inconsistency between Don mar and Kureag is unfounded 
because the plaintiff in Donmar, in contrast to Refco in Kureag, never argued it was a seller of 
dollars under Article 2 and thereby entitled to a right of reclamation. Indeed, no Article 2 
provision was raised in Donmar. The plaintiff argued that it had a right to reclaim the 
$524,000 under§ 4A-207 (which concerns payment orders that do not identify a beneficiary), 
and the court properly rejected the argument. Donmar, 828 F. Supp. at 1239. 
Two additional concerns might lie behind the Federal Reserve's position. First, reclama-
tion could allow a creditor of a failed bank to circumvent a foreign insolvency proceeding. 
Second, reclamation could undermine regulatory efforts to develop systems for netting (or 
off setting) foreign exchange delivery obligations among the players in the global currency 
bazaar. These concerns, like the fear discussed above, are dubious. See Raj Bha1a, Self-Regula-
tion in Global Electronic Markets Through &invigurated Trade Usages, 31 IDAHO L. REv. (forthcom-
ing 1995) (manuscript at 33-35, on file with author). 
75. See Melzer, 194 N.Y.S. at 223; Zimmerman, 207 N.Y.S. at 371. 
76. 176 N.Y.S. 223 (N.Y. App. Div. 1919). In &isfeld, the buyer purchased Russian ru-
bles. At issue was whether the contract of purchase was enforceable under the statute of 
frauds in New York's Personal Property Law whose coverage excluded "money." The notes 
were issued by the Tsarist government that had been overthrown in the 1917 Bolshevik 
revolution and, therefore, could not be used as a medium of payment. The court decided 
that because the buyer purchased the notes for resale, they were not excluded from the 
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Rothschild, 77 and Richard v. American Union Bank, 78 established an intended 
use test. They focused on the intent of the buyer of foreign currency to 
determine whether foreign currency is a commodity or a means of pay-
ment under the relevant statute of frauds. Under the reasoning of these 
cases, if Citibank intends to resell the 120 million yen, then the yen are 
commodities and fall within Article 2. Alternatively, if Citibank plans to 
use the yen in Japan to purchase goods (other than foreign currency) and 
services, then the yen are a medium of payment and excluded from the 
statute. All three cases held that foreign currency was a commodity sub-
ject to the relevant statute.79 Thus, it is not difficult to line up pre-U.C.C. 
cases against, as well as for, the Federal Reserve's position. 
Of course, the pre-U.C.C. cases against that position are as outdated 
and unworthy of reliance as the cases in the Federal Reserve's favor. For 
example, classifying foreign exchange as a commodity versus a medium of 
payment based on the buyer's intent raises doctrinal and evidentiary 
problems. Should an objective or subjective test be used to determine in-
tention? How should intention be proved? Moreover, the distinction be-
tween resale and use as a medium of payment makes little sense. Suppose 
Citibank intends to resell the 120 million yen to another bank. Why 
should this case be treated differently from a case where a U.S. importer of 
Japanese goods buys 120 million yen in order to pay aJapanese exporter 
for the goods? Finally, the intended use test suggested by the Reisfeld, 
Liepman, and Richard courts is at variance with the plain meaning of 
"goods" in section 2-105. The U.C.C.'s definition does not contemplate a 
focus on anything other than the immediate transaction.80 In sum, the 
net result from reviewing pre-U.C.C. cases is an unhelpful and essentially 
irrelevant stalemate. 
2. A Formalistic Distinction 
The second problem with the aggressively exclusive approach is that it 
relies on an overly formalistic distinction-physical currency versus bank 
credit-to determine the scope of U.C.C. Article 2. Just because Citibank 
statute. Its holding also rested on the characterization of the rubles as choses in action. ld. at 
224. 
77. 262 S.W. 685 (Mo. Ct. App. 1924). The contract in Liepman involved the purchase of 
marks and the issue was enforceability of the contract under a statute of frauds that covered 
goods but excluded "money." ld. at 685. Because the U.S. and Germany were at war, the 
court reasoned, the buyer could not have intended to use the marks as a medium of pay-
ment. Therefore, they were a commodity within the statute of frauds. I d. at 686. 
78. 170 N.E. 532 (N.Y. 1930). This case involved a contract to buy two million 
Romanian lei. The contract called for a cable transfer of foreign currency into the buyer's 
bank account in Bucharest, but delivery was delayed and the buyer sued for damages. Id. at 
533-34. The court held that the transaction was for a commodity because the buyer intended 
to resell the lei in the U.S., not spend the money in Romania. ld. at 535. 
79. See Resfeld, 176 N.Y.S. at 224; Liepman, 2626 S.W. at 686; Richard, 170 N.E. at 535. 
80. Compare U.C.C. § 2-105(1) (defining "Goods" as "all things ... movable at the time 
of identification to the contract for sale.") with Reisfeld, 176 N.Y.S. at 224 (noting "that the 
rubles were bought for resale") and Liepman, 262 S.W. at 686 (because of the war with Ger-
many, the marks were intended to be a commodity) and Richard, 170 N.E. at 535 (buyer 
intended to resell the lei in the U.S.). 
1994] GLOBAL CURRENCY BAZAAR 21 
obtains a credit of 120 million yen does not prohibit it from withdrawing 
that credit in physical currency. Presumably, unless a buyer and seller 
agree otherwise, a buyer of foreign exchange has the right to demand 
delivery of physical currency in place of a credit. The fact that Citibank 
elects to keep its yen in the form of a bank balance on deposit instead of 
physical currency should not affect Citibank's contractual rights and obli-
gations. Citibank's decision is merely one of convenience, economy, and 
security. It is easier, cheaper, and safer to store 120 million yen electroni-
cally than in bills in a Brooklyn warehouse. 
More fundamentally, the scope of Article 2 should not depend on 
whether the buyer converted bank credits to cash. If it did, then form 
would triumph over substance and form could be manipulated. Citibank 
could easily "shop" among legal regimes, opting into or out of Article 2, by 
choosing the form of delivery. Only an agreement with DBS that Citibank 
would maintain the yen in a specific form would limit Citibank's freedom 
to manipulate the legal rights and duties of the parties. A much more 
pragmatic evaluation-whether Article 2 serves the needs of Citibank and 
DBS-ought to determine the scope of the statute. 
3. The Drafters' Intention 
The exclusionary approach may be inconsistent with the intention of 
the drafters of the U.C.C. The official comment to section 2-105 clearly 
suggests that the drafters intended to include the sale of money as a com-
modity within the scope of the Article. 81 It is not a question of the drafters 
failing to foresee foreign exchange transactions-the comment evinces 
this foresight. Rather, the drafters did not anticipate that foreign ex-
change would occur electronically and that it would appear in computer-
ized bank account records. If they had envisioned these developments, 
then they might have incorporated a definition of "things in action" to 
avoid confusion as to scope. 
More generally, aggressively excluding foreign exchange transactions 
reflects an intransigence that is inconsistent with the drafters' goal of cre-
ating a workable and adaptable statute. They wanted the statute to be 
interpreted flexibly and liberally.82 Only then could it could be adapted 
to new commercial contexts like the currency bazaar. 
4. Underlying Principles 
The exclusionary approach may be inimical to the underlying princi-
ples of the U.C.C.: simplification,83 modemization,84 uniformity,85 cer-
81. See, e.g., New York U.C.C. § 2-105, Practice Commentary, at 94-95 (McKinney 1964); 
§ 2-105, New York Annotations, at 97 (McKinney 1964). But see id. § 2-201, New York Annota-
tions, note (l)(a) at 119-20 (McKinney 1964) (stating that the original version of the Uni-
form Sales Act governed contracts for choses in action but later the Act was amended to 
exclude choses in action). 
82. See U.C.C. § 1-102 cmt. I; infra notes 98-105 and accompanying text. 
83. U.C.C. § l-102(2)(a). 
84. !d. 
85. !d. § l-102(2)(c). 
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tainty,86 and support for commercial transactions.87 If foreign exchange 
transactions are wholly excluded from Article 2, then they become subject 
to non-uniform, obsolete legal regimes, namely, pre-U.C.C. common law 
or non-U.C.C. sales statutes.88 Yet, pre-existing sales law was simplified 
and modernized by Article 2, 89 and Article 2 unified the sales law of vari-
ous states.90 Potentially applying the sales laws of fifty different states ren-
ders the law of sales as it pertains to foreign exchange transactions more 
complex, arcane, and disjointed.91 
This possibility generates uncertainty for foreign exchange market 
participants. Providing a precise and predictable legal framework that en-
hances certainty for businesspersons is a founding principle of Article 2.92 
Taking foreign exchange transactions out of this framework obviously con-
tradicts this principle. Uncertainty is further exacerbated if courts, seek-
ing to keep a foreign exchange transaction within Article 2, manipulate 
facts to make foreign exchange more closely resemble a paradigmatic 
good. 
The drafters of Article 2 sought a sales statute that would foster com-
mercial development.93 Tossing foreign exchange transactions to the va-
garies of non-U.C.C. law may inhibit innovation in the foreign exchange 
market. 94 For example, market participants like Citibank and DBS may 
face difficulty devising a uniform practice of confirming transactions elec-
tronically because many different statutes of frauds potentially apply. The 
need to protect ongoing commercial relations is concomitant with the 
86. While certainty is not expressly mentioned in U.C.C. § 1-102, the principles set forth 
in that section imply increased certainty as to legal rights and obligations. It has been ar-
gued, however, that simplification and clarification are fallacious principles, see,e.g., Charles 
E. Clark, The Restatement of Contracts, 42 YALE LJ. 643, 653 (1933), and costly to achieve. See, 
e.g., James Gordley, European Codes and American Restatements: Some Difficulties, 81 CoLUM. L. 
REv. 140, 156-7 (1981). 
87. u.c.c. § 1-102(2)(b). 
88. An analogous problem exists for hybrid sales-service contracts and (to a lesser extent 
given the enactment of Article 2A) lease contracts. An example of a non-U.C.C. sales statute 
is New York's General Obligations Law. See infra note 108. 
A tension may exist between providing certainty and predictability for commercial par-
ties through codification, on the one hand, and stifling innovation in a market as a result of 
codification, on the other hand. The difficult, time-consuming nature of revising a code-as 
the current experience with Article 2 illustrates-reinforces concerns about inhibiting the 
expansion of new commercial practices. See Marion W. Benfield, Jr. & Peter A. Alces, 
Reinventing the Whee~ 35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1405 (1994). 
89. For a discussion of the need to simplifY and update sales law, see Arthur L. Corbin, 
The Uniform Commercial Code-Sales; Should It & Enacted?, 59 YALE LJ. 821, 834-5 (1950); Karl 
Llewellyn, The General Scope of the Uniform Commercial Code, 1950 NJ. ST. B.A.Y.B. 73, 75. 
90. For a discussion of the importance of unifying sales law, see Llewellyn, supra note 89, 
at 73. 
91. See, e.g., Murray, supra note 68, at 456 (discussing wide variations in non-U.C.C. stan-
dards among states). 
92. E.g., In re Automated Bookbinding Serv. Inc., 471 F.2d 546, 552 (4th Cir. 1972). 
93. See, e.g., Llewellyn, supra note 89, at 73. 
94. For a discussion of how the solar energy industry was harmed by the denial of the 
application of the implied warranties of Article 2 to the sale and installation of solar energy 
devices, see Harry R Wright, Jr., Comment, The Sales-8eroice Dichotomy: A Roadblock to Con-
sumer Acceptance of Domestic Solar Energy Devices, 30 MERCER L. REv. 547, 552-54 (1979). 
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need to support commercial development.95 Currency bazaar participants 
like Citibank and DBS are repeat players-they are well known to each 
other and deal with one another on a daily basis. Application of Article 2 
may place these relations, particularly with respect to matters of contract 
formation, on a firm legal foundation.96 
C. The Pragmatic Strategy 
Official comment 1 to section 1-102 aims to prevent U.C.C. Article 2 
from aging while maintaining its strength as a foundation for commercial 
parties: 
This Act is drawn to provide flexibility so that, since it is in-
tended to be a semi-permanent piece of legislation, it will provide 
its own machinery for expansion of commercial practices. It is 
intended to make it possible for the law embodied in this Act to 
be developed by the courts in the light of unforeseen and new 
circumstances and practices.97 
The drafters knew subsequent generations of lawyers would face new 
transactional horizons. They realized Article 2 would be discarded if it 
failed to satisfY the needs of the parties.98 Thus, they drafted Article 2 so it 
could adapt to a variety of contractual contexts that were not overtly con-
templated by the drafters.99 The statute's style is deliberately "loose" and 
"open-ended."100 Many of its provisions articulate standards of contract 
law and principles of justice rather than specific, technical rules. 101 
Neither the carelessly inclusive approach of the United Equities, 
Saboundjian, Intershoe, IB], and Koreag courts, nor the aggressively exclusive 
approach of the Federal Reserve, heeds the advice of the drafters. The 
first approach lacks articulated standards and reasoning. The second ap-
proach is rigid. Both approaches neglect new ways of conducting business 
and the realistic needs of businesspersons. A new pragmatic strategy is 
95. See Eugene F. Mooney, Old Ktmtract Principles and Karl's New Kode: An Essay tm the 
jurisprudence of Our New Commercial Law, 11 VILL. L. REv. 213, 230 (1966). 
96. One practical mechanism that repeat players can use to avoid a statute of frauds 
problem is to waive the statute of frauds defense in a model or master agreemenL Strangely, 
the IFEMA contains no such waiver. See generally, IFEMA, supra note 14. If it had the waiver, 
then the problem would be acute only for non-repeat players, i.e., non-parties to the IFEMA. 
97. U.C.C. § 1-102 cmt. 1. 
98. Indeed, "[t)he origins of the Uniform Commercial Code lie in the law merchant, a 
specialized body of usages, or customs, that governed contracts dealing with commercial mat-
ters until the seventeenth· century." 1 E. AllAN FARNswORTH, FARNSWORTH oN CoNTRAcrs 
§ 1.9, at 34 (1990). The rules laid down in the U.C.C. can be viewed as a reflection of what 
the drafters thought was the best market practice of merchants. Not surprisingly, therefore, a 
number of provisions of Article 2 impose higher standards on merchants than on other sorts 
of parties. /d. § 1.10, at 42-43. 
99. See William D. Hawkland, Uniform Commercial 'Code' Methodology, 1962 U. ILL. L.F. 291, 
314 (1962); Mitchell Franklin, On the Legal Method of the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 LAw & 
CoNTEMP. PRoss. 330, 333 (1951); see also Farnsworth, supra note 98, § 1.10, at 40-41 (discuss-
ing the adaptability of a general body of contract law to many different types of transactions). 
100. Grant G. Gilmore, In Memoriam: Karl LleweUyn, 71 YALE LJ. 813, 814 (1962); see also 
Homer Kripke, The Principles Underlying the Drafting of the Uniform Commercial Code, 1962 U. ILL. 
L.F. 321, 328. 
101. Note, Disengaging Sales Law from the Sale Construct: A Proposal to Extend the Scope of 
Article 2 of the UCC, 96 HARv. L. REv. 470, 484 (1982). 
24 DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:1 
needed to decide whether foreign exchange fits the definition of "goods" 
and, accordingly, whether foreign exchange transactions are subject to Ar-
ticle 2. This model gains support from Article 2's invitation to courts and 
commentators to consider the needs of commercial parties by expanding 
the scope of the statute accordingly.102 
Under the pragmatic strategy, the determining factor is whether Arti-
cle 2 furnishes rules that meet the needs of participants in the currency 
bazaar. Insofar as Article 2 serves these needs, it retains its vitality in new 
transactional settings. In turn, it promotes certainty in foreign exchange 
dealings and the development of the foreign exchange market. Article 2 
should be tailored to avoid the undesirable repercussions of applying the 
statute of frauds to foreign exchange transactions. Such a revision would 
follow the pragmatism countenanced by the drafters of the official com-
ment quoted above.l03 
The sine qua non of the pragmatic strategy is the acknowledgment that 
foreign exchange trading is inherently fraught with uncertainties and 
risks. For example, Citibank buys yen and sells dollars because it expects 
yen to appreciate relative to the dollar. There is currency risk-yen could 
depreciate and Citibank could lose money on the transaction. Rules of 
sales law, such as the statute of frauds, potentially exacerbate the uncer-
tainties and risks associated with foreign exchange trading. Uncertainties 
and risks should be minimized. 
Put another way, problems that Citibank and DBS might incur in 
their dollar-yen deal should be resolved efficiently. Efficiency in the con-
text of the foreign exchange market is a two-dimensional concept involv-
ing certainty and cost. Market participants need unambiguous rules 
setting forth whether foreign exchange contract obligations are enforcea-
ble. The rules should not impose unnecessary transaction costs on the 
participants. In sum, rules of contract enforceability that enhance cer-
tainty and reduce cost should be the legal cornerstone for wealth-generat-
ing foreign exchange transactions.104 To the extent sales law does not 
serve as this cornerstone, it should be changed. 
It is beyond the scope of this article to examine every provision of 
Article 2 from this pragmatic perspective in order to decide conclusively 
whether the statute ought to govern foreign exchange transactions. The 
102. A feature of the pragmatic strategy is that it is designed for cases where it is arguable 
whether a transaction should be included within the scope of Article 2. Because real estate 
transactions, for example, clearly are excluded, the strategy is inapplicable. But how close is 
close enough? There is no attempt herein to set forth criteria as to how persuasive the argu-
ments must be for and against inclusion in Article 2 before the pragmatic strategy should be 
used. " 
103. See U.C.C. § 1-102 cmt. l. 
104. Another important goal, appropriate risk-allocation, should be noted. The risks that 
the rules address should be allocated between two banks engaged in a foreign exchange 
transaction according to a "better position" criterion-the bank that can most cheaply insure 
against the loss should bear the risk in question. With respect to the statute of frauds, the 
risk that a contract is unenforceable is evenly distributed. Similarly, if the proposals dis-
cussed below regarding the statute of frauds are implemented, this risk would be evenly 
distributed. 
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pragmatic strategy, however, can yield a tentative resolution to the scope 
problem within the confines of one article. It can be applied to an Article 
2 provision of fundamental importance, the statute of frauds. As Professor 
Farnsworth writes, "[i] t would be difficult to imagine a question more im-
portant to a person expecting to make agreements in an unfamiliar legal 
system than this: when is a writing required to make an agreement en-
forceable?"105 Further, the statute of frauds set forth in section 2-201 has 
caused consternation among foreign exchange market participants. How 
this section affects the market is an important piece in the puzzle of the 
scope of Article 2. 
IV. ENFORCEA.BILilY-DOES THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS SERVE MARKET 
NEEDS? 
Had the statute of frauds been always carried into execution according to 
the letter, it would have done ten times more mischief than it has done 
good, by protecting, rather than by preventing, frauds. 106 
The statute of frauds, set forth in section 2-201 (1), states: 
[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this section a contract for the 
sale of goods for the price of $500 or more is not enforceable by 
way of action or defense unless there is some writing sufficient to 
indicate that a contract for sale has been made between the par-
ties and signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought 
or by his authorized agent or broker. 107 
105. 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 98, § 6.1. 
106. 1 WILUAM BLAcKSTONE, CoMMENTARIES 601 (1844) (quoting Justice Wilmot's con-
currence in Simon v. Metivier); Robert L. Misner, Tape Recardings, Business Transactions Via 
Telephone, and the Statute of Frauds, 61 IowA L. REv. 941, 942 (1976). 
107. U.C.C. § 2-201(1) (emphasis added). Because of the tense used in§ 2-201 (namely, 
the words "has been made") it is evident that the statute of frauds does not require that a 
contract be in writing; it can be oral. Rather, the statute of frauds requires that a document 
exist to provide reliable evidence of the existence of the contract. Otherwise it is not en-
forceable. See, e.g., Monetti, S.P.A. v. Anchor Hocking Corp., 931 F. 2d 1178, 1182, 1185 (7th 
Cir. 1991) (Posner, J.). This distinction between contract formation and enforceability is 
seen in the IFEMA. Section 8.3 of the IFEMA indicates a foreign exchange contract is oral 
and that the IFEMA is the written evidence thereof. See IFEMA, supra note 14. 
In attempting to show that a writing sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds exists, it is 
impermissible to rely on oral testimony. See Monetti, 931 F.2d at 1181; Southmark Corp. v. 
Life Investors, Inc., 851 F.2d 763, 767 n.5 (5th Cir. 1988). The writing, however, need not 
take the form of a single document. The integration of several documents prepared at differ-
ent times may satisfy the statute of frauds. See Migerobe, Inc. v. Certina USA, Inc., 924 F.2d 
1330, 1333 (5th Cir. 1991); Hunt Oil Co. v. FERC, 853 F.2d 1226, 1241 (5th Cir. 1988). The 
writing or writings need not be directed or delivered to the other party, nor do they have to 
be made for purposes of satisfying the statute of frauds. See 2 FARNswORTH, supra note 98, 
§ 6.7, at 406-07. 
The statute of frauds applies prospectively as well as retrospectively. For example, it 
applies to future oral modifications of a contract that originally fell within the statute. Also, if 
a contract that did not originally fall within the ambit of the statute of frauds is modified, and 
the modified contract falls within the statute, then the requirements of the statute must be 
satisfied. U.C.C. § 2-209(3). 
Some commentators suggest that the statute of frauds does not cover every transaction 
that is within the scope of Article 2. See, e.g., 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 98, § 6.6, at 402-03 & 
n.5. As discussed above, U.C.C. § 2-102 states that Article 2 governs "transactions" in goods. 
See supra note 50 and accompanying text. In contrast, § 2-201(1) quoted above refers to 
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If section 2-201(1) were applied strictly to the Citibank-DBS dollar-yen 
spot agreement, then it would be unenforceable. 108 Assuming written 
confirmations are not exchanged, Citibank and DBS have nothing to sign, 
and clearly the value of the transaction exceeds $500. The tape recording 
of the telephone conversations between the traders does not satisfy the 
writing requirement of the statute of frauds. 109 
More generally, all of the foreign exchange transactions in which writ-
ten confirmations are not exchanged are unenforceable if the Article 2 
statute of frauds is strictly construed.110 Immediately, then, it is apparent 
"contract[s]" for the sale of goods. This reasoning, however, does not appear to have been 
widely accepted; hence it seems unlikely that a court would rule that foreign exchange trans-
actions are governed by Article 2 but excluded from the statute of frauds on the basis of the 
"transaction" /"contract" distinction. 
108. Courts sometimes confuse enforceability with validity. See, e.g., Tri-State Petroleum 
Corp. v. Saber Energy, Inc., 845 F.2d 575, 579 (5th Cir. 1988) (stating that the litigants are 
not "asserting that any oral contract is invalid because of the statute of frauds"). A contract is 
not void just because it fails to satisfY the statute of frauds. This failure means that the trans-
action cannot be "judicially enforced in favor of a party to the contract." U.C.C. § 2-201 cmt. 
4; see also Glover School & Office Equip. Co. v. Dave Hall, Inc., 372 A.2d 221, 223 (Del. Super. 
Ct. 1977) (stating "the beginning premise is that an oral contract is valid and enforceable 
unless prohibited or restricted by some statutory provision [such as the Statute of Frauds]"). 
This result contrasts with that which would be obtained under§ 5-701 (a) of New York's 
General Obligations Law ("G.O.L."}, a non-U.C.C. statute of frauds. The G.O.L. is poten-
tially relevant to the global currency bazaar because the U.S. is one of the three largest for-
eign exchange trading centers in the world. The three countries with the largest average 
daily turnover of foreign exchange transactions are the United Kingdom ($300 billion daily), 
the U.S. ($192 billion daily), and japan ($126 billion daily). Central Bank Survey, supra note 
3, at 13-14. Undoubtedly, New York accounts for the bulk of the U.S. activity. Section 5-
701 (a) of the G.O.L. states that a contract is absolutely void "unless it or some note or memo-
randum thereof be in writing, and subscribed by the party to be charged therewith, or by his 
lawful agent, if such [contract] ... [b]y its terms is not to be performed within one year from 
the making thereof." N.Y. GEN. Osuc. LAw.§ 5-701 (a) (1) (McKinney 1989). This statute of 
frauds would not render a spot foreign exchange contract void because it is performed 
within two days. (Nor ·would § 5-701 (a) of the G.O.L. render a forward foreign exchange 
contract void so long as the value date of the contract is within one year. Most forward 
contracts are completed in less than one year). Hence, there is a potential conflict between 
U .C. C. § 2-201, which renders a spot contract unenforceable, and G.O.L. § 5-701 (a)( 1), 
which does not render it void. Under U.C.C. § 1-103, which states that pre-U.C.C. law is 
applicable unless displaced by provisions of the U.C.C., § 2-201 prevails. See H & W Indus. v. 
Formosa Plastics Corp., 860 F.2d 172, 180 (5th Cir. 1988). For a discussion of the application 
of this statute of frauds, see Cathy L. Scarborough, Fureign Exchange Contracts: What Statute of 
Frauds Applies in New York~, 4 INT'L L. PRACTICUM 17, 20-21 (1991). 
109. See infra notes 117-66 and accompanying text. For a recent discussion of electronic 
signatures and the requirement of a signed writing, see Sharon F. DiPaolo, Note, The Applica-
tion of the Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-201 Statute of Frauds to Electronic Commerce, 13 J.L. & 
CoM. 143 (1993). 
110. Section 2-201 is not the only statute of frauds in the U.C.C. that would render such 
transactions unenforceable. For example, U.C.C. § 8-319 sets forth a writing requirement for 
the sale of investment securities. See infra note 130. Similarly, U.C.C. § 9-203 establishes a 
requirement for security agreements. 
In the context of foreign exchange transactions, U.C.C. § 1-206 could be relevant. It is a 
residual, gap-filling provision that covers sales of personal property not otherwise covered by 
the aforementioned sections. U.C.C. § 1-206(2) & cmt. U.C.C. § 1-206(1) states that a con-
tract for the sale of personal property is unenforceable beyond $5,000 "unless there is some 
writing which indicates that a contract for sale has been made between the parties at a de-
fined or stated price, reasonably identifies the subject matter, and is signed by the party 
against whom enforcement is sought or by his authorized agent." 
The official comment to U.C.C. § 1-206 states that two "principal gap[s]" are filled by 
that section. The first gap relates to the sale of general intangibles as defined in U .C. C. § 9-
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that strictly applying section 2-201 (1) could wreak destructive havoc in the 
currency bazaar. 111 This result indicates section 2-201(1) does not serve 
the needs of market participants: no law should threaten the foundations 
of an otherwise well-functioning market that is worthy of preservation. 
This conclusion is reinforced by the application of the pragmatic strat-
egy-specifically, the analyses of the costs, benefits, and purposes of the 
statute-set forth below.112 Thus, the model calls for the rejection of Ci-
tibank's affirmative defense. The model also suggests DBS's response has 
merit, namely, that foreign exchange should be excluded from section 2-
105(1) and thus from the reach of section 2-201(1). This argument, how-
ever, cannot yet be accepted. 
A. The Clash of Cultures 
There is an uneasy tension between the technology and business prac-
tices of the foreign exchange market on the one hand, and the demands 
of contract enforceability rules in sales law on the other hand. The tech-
nology is telephonic. It expands the ways in which market participants 
negotiate and execute currency trades. Communications between Ci-
tibank, DBS and the like are not face-to-face meetings in which written 
draft contracts are exchanged and marked up by lawyers representing the 
106. See also 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 98, § 6.6, at 404. As discussed above, foreign ex-
change can be categorized as a thing in action. See supra notes 66-72 and accompanying text; 
U.C.C. § 9-106. Section 9-106 specifically includes things in action in the definition of 
"[g]eneral intangibles." 
The second gap concerns transactions excluded from Article 9 by U.C.C. § 9-104. Sec-
tion 9-104(1) of the U.C.C. indicates that Article 9 is inapplicable "to a transfer of an interest 
in any deposit account." A "deposit account" covers "a demand, time, savings, passbook or 
like account maintained with a bank." U.C.C. § 9-105(e). Certainly, accounts maintained by 
Citibank and DBS for foreign exchange trading purposes would be "deposit accounts" ex-
cluded from Article 9. 
Consequently, contracts for foreign exchange could fall into either or both of the gaps 
and thereby come within the ambit of § 1-206. This result is obtained only if foreign ex-
change is a thing in action and not a good governed by Article 2 and its statute of frauds. 
Such a result would not affect the analysis in this article. The same concerns about the 
costs, benefits, and purposes of the statute of frauds are relevant to U.C.C. § 2-201 or§ 1-206. 
Indeed, because U.C.C. § 2-201 requires that a writing contain only a quantity term, while 
§ 1-206 requires more, the arguments below apply to U.C.C. § 1-206 a fortiori. Compare 
U.C.C. § 2-201 cmt. I with U.C.C. § 1-206(1). See generaUy Note, The Unifarm Commercial Code, 
Section 1-206-A New Departure in the Statute ofFraudsr, 70YALE LJ. 603 (1961) (comparing the 
requirements of§ 1-206 and§ 2-201). 
Ill. This unhappy scenario has spurred legislative action in New York. Recently, the New 
York legislature passed an amendment to G.O.L. § 5-701 that excludes "qualified financial 
contracts" from the statute of frauds. Act of july 20, 1994, ch. 467, sec. 1, § 5-701 (b), 1994 
N.Y. LAws 467 (codified as amended at N.Y. GEN. Osuc. LAw § 5-701 (McKinney 1994). 
Such contracts include spot and forward foreign exchange contracts and currency swaps. 
The bill was transmitted to Governor Mario Cuomo for his signature on july 8, 1994. N.Y.A 
11513, 215th G.A., 2d Sess. (1994). Similar amendments are proposed in the bill for§§ 1-206 
and 2-201, which raises the specter of non-uniformity in New York's U.C.C. vis-a-vis the 
U.C.C. of other states. The bill is actively supported by the ISDA, a trade association repre-
senting participants in the over-the-counter derivatives markets. See Memorandum from 
Daniel Cunningham and Catherine Struve to ISDA Board of Directors re: Amendment of 
New York Statute of Frauds Qune 2, 1994) (on file with author). The ISDA memo is accom-
panied by a form letter favoring the amendments that ISDA members are encouraged to 
send to New York legislators. 
112. See infra notes 167-216 and accompanying text. 
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parties during endless rounds of coffee and take-out sandwiches. The 
trading floors of Citibank and DBS are entirely different from the conven-
tional lawyers' conference room; traders often communicate by tele-
phone. In sum, the deals made in the currency bazaar are oral and are 
concluded rapidly and informally. 11 3 
The statute of frauds must adapt to this telephonic technology. Eng-
land accepted a similar proposition many years ago. In 1954, the English 
Law Reform Committee successfully advocated the repeal of the statute of 
frauds, in part because a writing requirement is " 'out of accord with the 
way in which business is normally done.' "114 Unfortunately, this proposi-
tion has not gained respectability in the U.S. Except for the current note-
worthy attempt at revising U.C.C. Article 2, "[t]here has been no serious 
movement to abolish the statutes of frauds in this country, though they 
have had many critics."115 Foreign exchange market participants might 
not reduce their agreements to writing for good reason. Because bid-ask 
spreads are thin for trading in liquid currencies, profits are made through 
a high volume of trading. To maximize profits, market participants seek 
to conclude as many transactions as cheaply and quickly as possible. Out-
dated legal formalities like the statute of frauds requirements lead to 
higher transaction costs and delay the completion of transactions. Not 
surprisingly, many market participants prefer tape recordings of conversa-
tions among traders instead of written agreements. 
The law also must account for the culture of the currency bazaar. 
Trust among participants in the foreign exchange market is high. Perhaps 
this aspect of business culture also distinguishes the trading floor from the 
conference room. The participants repeatedly deal with one another. To 
engage in fraudulent or deceptive practices is to invite ostracism: a 
trader's unctuous behavior quickly becomes widely known and other trad-
ers decide it is risky and imprudent to deal with the rogue trader. In 1966, 
an author of a textbook on foreign exchange observed that "[m] ost deal-
ers with very long experience have never had a single lawsuit arising from 
misunderstandings in respect of foreign exchange transactions."116 The 
observation remains true today. 
Two variations of the hypothetical spot transaction presented in Part 
II will illustrate that the statute of frauds should be reformed or abolished 
in the context of the foreign exchange market. In Case One, the tele-
phone conversation between the Citibank and DBS traders is taped. How-
ever, no written confirmations are exchanged between the parties. Case 
ll3. Undoubtedly, these features, and the phenomenon of telephonic and computer-to-
computer communications, are found in many other modem markets. Accordingly, the po-
tential applicability of the pragmatic strategy is not limited to the foreign exchange market. 
ll4. 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 98, § 6.1, at 371 (quoting UNITED KINGDOM LAw REviSION 
COMMITTEE ON THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS AND THE DOCTRINE OF CoNSIDERATION, SIXTH INTERIM 
REPoRT, CMD. No. 5449, 6-7 (1937)). 
ll5. 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 98, § 6.1, at 371. Farnsworth is referring specifically to 
non-U.C.C. statutes of frauds enacted in most states, but his remark is equally true with re-
spect to U.C.C. § 2-201. 
ll6. PAUL EINZIG, A TEXTBOOK ON FoREIGN ExCHANGE 41 (1966). 
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One raises the problem of compliance with section 2-201 (1), the funda-
mental statute of frauds provision. The problem is solved if section 2-
201 (1) is judicially reinterpreted or legislatively modified so that tape re-
cordings satisfy the "writing" and "signature" requirements of that section. 
In Case Two, the operations departments of Citibank and DBS ex-
change such confirmations subsequent to the tape-recorded, telephonic 
conversation between their traders. This Case raises a the problem of 
compliance with section 2-201 (2), the merchant's exception to section 2-
201 ( 1). It is argued that the microeconomic costs of such confirmations 
do not justify the requirement that they be used. 
B. Case One: Tape Recardings as "Writings" 
1. The Tangibility Paradigm 
Twenty years ago Professor Misner argued that tape recordings 
should satisfy the statute offrauds.l 17 His argument, however, is incongru-
ous. He did not advocate that a tape recording be considered a "writing" 
for purposes of U.C.C. sections 1-201 ( 46) and 2-201. Instead, Misner ar-
gued that the recording's voiceprint should satisfy the "signature require-
ment of U.C.C. section 1-201(39).118 The real problem with Misner's 
argument, however, is that it is disappointingly conservative. 
Misner's argument is mired in the tangibility paradigm. This para-
digm does not consider the needs of a particular market like the currency 
bazaar. The market must fit the law, not the reverse. Most importantly, 
this paradigm requires some physically cognizable piece of paper to evi-
dence a contract under the statute of frauds. A " 'voiceprint' -the 
graphic output of high-speed sound spectrograph"119-meets the require-
ment. Thus, Misner's argument does not strike at the heart of the statute 
of frauds: it will not allow a tape recording alone to satisfy the statute. 
Ironically, in trying to cope with telephone business deals, Misner in 
effect advocated two writings to satisfy the statute of frauds-the 
voiceprint (which would be the "signature") combined with a written 
memorandum (which would be the "writing") .120 This solution is not only 
needlessly cumbersome and costly, but also inapposite to the special tech-
nologies and business practices of the currency bazaar. A more radical 
and efficient solution is required, whereby the tangibility paradigm is dis-
carded and full legal effect is given to tape recordings. 
2. Possible Legislative Amendments 
One such solution-rejected by Misner with little reasoning121 - is 
legislative action. Two straightforward legislative amendments might be 
appropriate. U.C.C. section 2-201 (1) states the "writing" must be "signed" 
117. Misner, supra note 106. 
118. !d. at 942, 945-56, 964. 
119. /d. at 946. 
120. /d. at 950. 
121. /d. at 943-46. 
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by the party (or her broker) against whom enforcement of the contract is 
sought. Under section 1-201(46), a" 'writing' includes a printing, type-
writing or any other intentional reduction to tangible form." 122 A legisla-
tive amendment is needed to bring tape recordings squarely within the 
meaning of a "writing." The following phrase could be added at the end 
of section 1-201(46) to accomplish this goal: "and a tape recording or 
other recording on magnetic tape."l23 
Under U.C.C. section 1-201 (39), "'signed' includes any symbol exe-
cuted or adopted by a party with present intention to authenticate a writ-· 
ing." To ensure consistency with the ten:n "writing" as amended, the 
following phrase could be added at the end of section 1-201 (39): "and any 
statement of a speaker identifying the speaker that is tape-recorded or re-
corded on magnetic tape." 
Amending section 1-201(46) in the manner previously suggested, 
however, may be incongruous with the structure of U.C.C. Article 3 and 
other non-Article 3 provisions dealing with negotiable instruments. Rules 
regarding negotiable instruments are property rules that tum on the phys-
ical delivery of a tangible item. Such rules become nonsensical in an in-
tangible world. Accordingly, adjusting section 1-201 ( 46) could do more 
harm than good. 124 It is wise to consider two other legislative options in 
lieu of amending sections 1-201 ( 46) and 1-201 (39). 
One alternative is to add a definition of "record" in section 1-201. 
Indeed, in April 1994 the American Bar Association's Working Group on 
Electronic Writings and Notices of the Subcommittee on Electronic Com-
mercial Practices ("Working Group") approved a proposed definition of 
"record" that would embrace tape recordings: "'[r]ecord' means a dura-
ble representation of information which is in, or is capable of being re-
trieved or reproduced in, perceivable form. A record may be in writing or 
in any electronic or other media."125 As the Working Group explains: 
The term "record" is new. Throughout the Code, numerous 
provisions of the various Articles have required parties to com-
municate in "writing" as defined in Section 1-201(46). Given the 
rapid development of electronic and other communication and 
storage technologies, the requirement that documents or com-
122. U.C.C. § 1-201 (46). Obviously, a tape recording is not a "printing" or "typewriting." 
It can be transcribed, but then the transcription and not the tape itself is the writing. More-
over, a key feature common to printing and typewriting is that each is readable by the un-
aided human eye. This feature is not present with respect to tape recordings. See 1 RoNALD 
A. ANDERSON, ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CoDE§ 1-201:134 (2d ed. 1970). 
123. An alternative proposal may be derived from Professor Anderson's argument that a 
tape recording is not a "writing" because it "lack[s] the element of being 'readable' by the 
unaided human eye which is characteristic of printing and typewriting." 1 ANDERSON, supra 
note 122, § 1-201:134 This proposal calls for adding "or on any substance" after the words 
"tangible form" in § 1-201 (46). /d. Anderson's argument has been criticized by Misner for 
citing no authority. See Misner, supra note 106, at 947-48. 
124. See Patricia B. Fry, X Marl!s the Spot: New Technologies Compel New Concepts for Commer-
cial Law, 26 Lov. L.A. L. REv. 607, 612-16, 622-24 (1993). 
125. Letter from Patricia B. Fry, Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic M-
fairs, University of North Dakota School of Law, to Raj Bhala, Assistant Professor of Law, 
Marshall-Wythe School of Law, 5 (June 27, 1994). 
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munications be "written" or "in writing" no longer reflects ex-
isting or developing commercial practices. Examples of current 
technologies commercially used to communicate or store infor-
mation include, but are not limited to, magnetic media, optical 
discs, digital voice messaging systems, audio tapes and photo-
graphic media. 126 
31 
With the addition of the term "record" to section 1-201, there should be 
no need to modify the term "writing." The Working Group's proposal is 
gaining acceptance among other American Bar Association committees 
charged with studying the revision of the U.C.C. For example, the term 
"record" may be used in revisions to U.C.C. Articles 2 and 5.12' 
Another legislative option would be to change the statute of frauds to 
allow parties to vary it by agreement. While freedom of contract is a foun-
dation of Article 2, Citibank and DBS currently are not permitted to opt 
out of section 2-201 ( 1) .128 Adding a· phrase or sentence to section 2-
201 (1) that would allow them to vary the statute by agreement would pro-
vide the necessary freedom. 129 
3. Judicial Re-interpretation 
A different way of accomplishing the same task would be for judges to 
reinterpret sections 1-201(39) and (46) to encompass tape recordings. 
While this may be a time-consuming and uneven process, there is a textual 
basis for suchjudicial action. U.C.C. sections 1-201(39) and (46) contain 
the word "includes." Because this word does not limit the definition, a 
court could reasonably extend the definition to include non-paradigmatic 
writings. 
Unfortunately, some courts adhere to the tangibility paradigm. These 
courts take a formalistic view of tape recordings and, consequently, decide 
these non-paradigmatic writings do not satisfy the statute of frauds. For 
example, the issue in Swink & Co. v. CarroU McEntee & McGinley, Inc. was 
whether a tape-recorded oral contract for the sale of securities is enforcea-
126. !d. 
127. !d. at 2. 
128. See U.C.C. § 1-102 cmt 2 ("[T]he statute of frauds found in Section 2-201 ... does 
not explicitly preclude oral waiver of the requirement of a writing, but a fair reading denies 
enforcement to such a waiver as part of the 'contract' made unenforceable .... "); U.C.C. § 1-
205 cmt. 4 (referring to the Article 2 statute of frauds as a "mandatory rule ... whose very 
office is to control and restrict the actions of the parties, and which cannot be abrogated by 
agreement, or by a usage of trade"). 
129. The word "sign" (or "signature," "signatures," "signed," or "signer") appears in 
U.C.C. §§ 2-205 (the merchant's firm offer rule) and 2-209 (concerning modification, rescis-
sion, and waiver). The word "writing" (or "written") appears in U.C.C. §§ 2-202 (the parol 
evidence rule), 2-203 (providing that seals are inoperative), 2-205, 2-207 (concerning addi-
tional terms in an acceptance or confirmation), 2-209, 2-316 (regarding the exclusion or 
modification of warranties), 2-509 (concerning risk of loss in the absence of a breach of 
contract), 2-605 (regarding a waiver of a buyer's objections to a delivery of goods), 2-607 
(relating to notice of a claim of litigation), and 2-616 (relating to notice of a material or 
indefinite delay). Modifying the statute of frauds as suggested above, or re-interpreting it as 
discussed below, is unlikely to upset these other provisions of Article 2. Foreign exchange 
contracts are between two parties and neither multiple writings nor signatures are involved. 
Thus, the rights and obligations of third parties would be unaffected by the proposals. 
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ble under the statute of frauds in Article 8 of the U.C.C.130 The court 
assumed that a tape recording is an "intentional reduction to tangible 
form" and, therefore, a "writing" under section 1-201 ( 46) .131 Neverthe-
less, the court held that the recording failed to satisfy the statute of frauds 
because it was not "signed" by the party against whom enforcement of the 
contract was sought.132 
The court in Roos v. Aloi also refused to re-interpret the statutory lan-
guage to reflect market practice.133 Again, the issue was the enforceability 
of an oral agreement for the sale of stock.134 The buyer argued the tape 
recorded conversation of the agreement satisfied the relevant statute of 
frauds. 135 The court rejected this argument in a highly ironic manner.136 
On one hand, the court noted that the parties (two equal shareholders in 
a closely-held corporation) were well known to each other. Consequently, 
strict adherence to the intricacies and formalities of corporate law was un-
necessary.137 On the other hand, the court slavishly followed a single pre-
cedent on the statute of frauds, even though the relationship of the parties 
and the surrounding facts and circumstances reliably indicated the exist-
ence of an enforceable contract. 138 
The facts of the Swink and Roos cases did not suggest that the tape-
recorded voices were not genuine. Perhaps the courts' decisions were 
based on concerns that a voice on tape is more difficult to authenticate 
than a handwritten signature. For such courts, reliability is the core of the 
statute of frauds "signature" requirement. Obviously, contracts should not 
be enforced if it is uncertain whether the defending party assumed con-
tractual obligations; but it is folly to think that authenticating recorded 
130. 584 S.W.2d 393, 394-96 (Ark. 1979). U.C.C. Article 8, which governs transactions in 
investment securities, contains a statute of frauds in § 8-319: 
[a] contract for the sale of securities is not enforceable by way of action or defense 
unless: 
(a) there is some writing signed by the party against whom enforcement is 
sought or by his authorized agent or broker, sufficient to indicate that a 
contract has been made for sale of a stated quantity of described securities 
at a defined or stated price. 
U.C.C. § 8-319. The fact that the statute offrauds at issue is U.C.C. § 8-319 does not render a 
case inapposite to the analysis of the Citibank-DBS dispute under U.C.C. § 2-201. The critical 
terms "writing" and "signed" are used in both sections and defined in exactly the same way in 
U.C.C. §§ 1-201 (46) and 1-201 (39), respectively. Moreover, U.C.C. § 8-319 cmt. 1 states that 
"[t]his Section is intended to conform the statute of frauds provisions with regard to securi-
ties to the policy of the like provisions in Article 2 (Section 2-201)." Indeed, examining cases 
arising under U.C.C. § 8-319 for clues about the interpretation of§ 2-201 is commonly done. 
See, e.g., Southmark Corp. v. Life Investors, Inc., 851 F.2d 763, 767 n.6 (5th Cir. 1988). 
131. Swink & Co., 584 S.W.2d at 398-99. 
132. /d. 
133. 487 N.Y.S.2d 637 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985). 
134. /d. 
135. /d. at 640. Those provisions were U.C.C. § 8-319 and New York's General Obligation 
Law. /d. at 642-43; see also infra note 130. 
136. RDos, 487 N.Y.S.2d at 642. See supra note 108 for a discussion of the General Obliga-
tions Law. 
137. RDos, 487 N.Y.S.2d at 640. 
138. /d. at 642-43. 
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voices is any more difficult than authenticating a signature on paper.139 
Indeed, impersonating a voice is probably far harder than forging a signa-
ture; hence, a tape recording may well be more reliable than a signature. 
Further, the vast majority of foreign exchange transactions, like the agree-
ment in the Roos case, involve repeat players whose voices are well-known 
to each other. Certainly the parties introduce themselves to each other 
before negotiating a spot foreign exchange deal. Courts that consistently 
apply the tangibility paradigm, such as the Swink and Roos courts, never 
entertain these considerations. 
The court in the Citibank-DBS dispute should avoid this paradigm's 
inherently formalistic approach. Instead, it should follow the opinion ren-
dered in Ellis Canning Co. v. Bernstein and hold that the tape-recorded con-
versations between Citibank and DBS satisfy section 2-201. 140 The facts of 
Bernstein closely resemble the disputed dollar-yen transaction. Bernstein 
orally agreed to sell the stock in United Packers, a company he owned and 
operated, to the Ellis Canning Company. Bernstein and the Ellis Canning 
representatives agreed to record the essential elements of the transac-
tion.141 Mter the taped conversation, letters and draft agreements were 
exchanged between Bernstein and Ellis Canning, though the parties' 
agreement was not memorialized in a signed writing. 142 Subsequently, a 
third party offered to buy the United Packers stock at a higher price than 
Ellis Canning had offered. Bernstein reneged on the deal with Ellis Can-
ning and sold the stock to the third party. 143 
The court rightly rejected Bernstein's affirmative defense that the 
contract with Ellis Canning was unenforceable under the statute of 
frauds. 144 It held that the tape recording satisfied the statute of frauds 
writing requirement because the parties had previously agreed in writing 
to be bound by the tape recording. 145 The court reasoned that if the par-
ties agreed to bind themselves to a recording of their agreement, then 
139. See, e.g., Misner, supra note 106, at 956-63 (discussing the scientific aspects of 
voiceprints). 
140. 348 F. Supp. 1212 (D. Colo. 1972). Professor Misner wrongly rejected the Bernstein 
decision, discussed below, as too liberal and, therefore, unlikely to be followed in different 
jurisdictions in a uniform manner. Misner, supra note 106, at 949-50, 964. A court decision 
in one jurisdiction that is squarely consistent with the needs of the market and the technolog-
ical and business culture of that market, and that makes rational economic sense, should be 
an attractive precedent for courts in other jurisdictions. Of course, possibly the best way to 
ensure that the Bernstein holding is uniformly adopted is to enact it legislatively. Yet, Misner 
rejected legislative solutions. Id. at 945-46. 
141. Bernstein, 348 F. Supp. at 1215-17. 
142. ld. at 1217-20. The letters and drafts are analogous to the written confirmations 
discussed in Case Two below. See infra notes 167-215 and accompanying text. 
143. Bernstein, 348 F. Supp. at 1220. 
144. Bernstein unsuccessfully argued that no contract had been formed with Elli~ Can-
ning because no meeting of the minds occurred. The court held that all the essential terms 
of the stock sale were agreed to notwithstanding certain objections to the structure of the 
transaction raised by Bernstein. ld. at 1221, 1225-28. 
145. ld. at 1228. While the court characterized this decision as a holding, a more con-
servative interpretation of the case is possible. The court plainly held that the letters and 
draft contracts exchanged by the parties satisfied the writing requirement of U.C.C. § 8-319. 
The court stated that it went "a step farther" in deciding that the tape recording, agreed to by 
the parties, satisfied the statute of frauds. Id. This step could be regarded as dicta. 
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"the contract [was] 'reduced to tangible form' when it [was] placed on the 
tape."146 Similarly, the signature requirement was met because its "clear 
purpose ... is to require identification of the contracting party and ... the 
identity of the oral contractors [was already] established" on tape.147 Un-
doubtedly, the court's outrage at Bernstein's behavior compelled this 
holding. After the taped conversation was concluded, Ellis Canning had 
provided working capital and management expertise to United Packing. 
As a result, the financial performance of United Packing markedly im-
proved.148 Bernstein took advantage of this improvement by selling his. 
stock in United Packing to a higher bidder. 
In the hypothetical Citibank-DBS dispute, the court benefits from two 
additional recent precedents that break away from the tangibility para-
digm. In Londono v. City of Gainesville, the court held that a tape recording 
of the city commissioner's action at a public meeting satisfied the signa-
ture requirement of the statute of frauds. 149 In Color & Design Exchange 
Inc. v. Standish, the court held that an oral statement made on the record 
in open court satisfies the statute of frauds. 150 The Londono and Standish 
decisions reflect a well-placed confidence in the reliability of tape record-
ings as evidence of a contract that is lacking in the Roos and Swink 
opinions.151 
4. Certainty 
By discarding the tangibility paradigm and enforcing the dollar-yen 
spot transaction, a court adjudicating the Citibank-DBS dispute ensures 
that the statute of frauds serves the needs of market participants. One 
such need is certainty as to the enforceability of spot deals. Knowing that 
existing obligations will be enforced, sellers of foreign exchange, like DBS, 
can comfortably reject new offers to buy currency. This certainty is partic-
ularly important in the volatile foreign exchange market where new offers 
are the inevitable result of dramatic, swift changes in rates. 
146. /d. 
147. /d. But see Swink & Co. v. Carroll McEntee & McGinley, Inc., 584 S.W.2d 393 (1979) 
(holding that a tape recording was a "writing," but the "signature" requirement was not met; 
hence the contract at issue was unenforceable). 
148. Bernstein, 348 F. Supp. at 1218. 
149. 768 F.2d 1223, 1227-28 n.4 (11th Cir. 1985). 
150. 593 A.2d 169, 170 (Conn. Super. Ct 1991). The statement was not made by the 
party to be charged, Standish, but by the attorney for the plaintiff seeking enforcement of the 
contract. The contract involved a personal guarantee made by Standish, the president of a 
corporation, for payment of a judgment rendered against his corporation. 
151. The Court adjudicating the Citibank-DBS dispute also has the benefit of several 
precedents establishing a liberal approach to the signature requirement. See, e.g., Barber & 
Ross Co. v. Lifetime Doors, Inc., 810 F.2d 1276 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 823 
(1987) (the trademark of a seller satisfied the signature requirement); Procyon Corp. v. 
Components Direct, Inc., 249 Cal. Rptr. 813 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (a buyer signed a letter of 
credit essentially by adopting the signature of the bank that issued the credit); Paloukos v. 
Intermountain Chevrolet Co., 588 P.2d 939 (Idaho 1978) (the business name of the seller 
printed on a worksheet satisfied the signature requirement); Automotive Spares Corp. v. 
Archer Bearings Co., 382 F. Supp. 513 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (letterhead satisfied the signature 
requirement); A&G Constr. Co. v. Reid Bros. Logging Co., 547 P.2d 1207 (Alaska 1976) 
(typed name was sufficient to satisfY the requirement). 
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5. Fraud Prevention or Fraud Promotion? 
A decision in the Citibank-DBS dispute that is consistent with the 
Bernstein, Londono, and Standish cases serves a second important market 
need-promoting market integrity and preventing fraud. Like Bernstein, 
Citibank is asking a court to ratify its unscrupulous behavior through the 
statute of frauds. Notions of fairness and justice dictate that the tape-re-
corded telephone transaction between Citibank and DBS should be an 
enforceable contract. 152 Applying the statute of frauds in this case is at 
best a hinderance to achieving a just result. It gives a party like Citibank a 
legal basis for welshing. 153 
On the other hand, the statute of frauds was intended to prevent 
fraudulent claims by thwarting perjured testimony in contract cases and by 
generally avoiding "the maladies of fraud and deceit." 154 As Professor 
Llewellyn stated: 
The effort of the Code (2-201) has been to deal with the essential 
purposes for which the Statute was designed, while getting and 
keeping away from the abuses: to wit, to make utterly essential 
some evidence in writing and over signature, or else some pretty 
good other evidence that rests on something more tangible than 
words of mouth. . . . [T] he Code adds both the desire and a 
reasonable machinery for a businessman to be able to rely on 
what both parties sign and on the fact that he has procured a 
memo signed by the other party. 155 
Thus, one could argue that circumscribing or abolishing the statute 
of frauds as an affirmative defense would constrain the ability of a court to 
render just opinions in egregious cases. Carefully applying the fundamen-
tal rules of contract formation, however, is a protective substitute. Sup-
pose that after the DBS trader provides the Citibank trader with a dollar-
yen quote, the Citibank trader says she is "strongly interested" in buying 
120 million yen and provides delivery instructions to the DBS trader. On 
the value date, DBS delivers 120 million yen to Citibank, but no reciprocal 
payment of$1,153,846.15 is made by Citibank. Assume that after the trade 
date, the yen depreciated relative to the dollar. Consequently, DBS is anx-
ious to sell its yen at the higher exchange rate that prevailed on the trade 
152. This position assumes that the tape recording meets the two basic requirements set 
forth in U.C.C. § 2-201 cmt. 1. First, there is "a basis for believing that ... a real transaction" 
occurred. Second, the quantity term is set forth. 
153. A contract should be enforced, even if the court must resort to the doctrine of prom-
issory estoppel. See Monetti, S.P.A. v. Anchor Hocking Corp., 931 F.2d 1178, 1185-86 (7th 
Cir. 1991) (discussing whether promissory estoppel can be used to avoid limitations on the 
enforcement of oral promises placed by the statute of frauds); South mark Corp. v. Life Inves-
tors, Inc., 851 F.2d 763, 771 (5th Cir. 1988) (stating that promissory estoppel should be 
invoked only when it would be inequitable for the court to apply the statute of frauds). 
154. Misner, supra note 106, at 943; see also DF Activities Corp. v. Brown, 851 F.2d 920, 
922, 924 (7th Cir. 1988) (Posner,]., plurality and Flaum,]., dissenting respectively); Holley 
Equip. Co. v. Credit Alliance Corp., 821 F.2d 1531, 1534 (11th Cir. 1987) (citing Campbell v. 
Campbell, 371 So.2d 55, 60 (Ala. Civ. App. 1979)); Levin v. Knight, 780 F.2d 786, 787 (9th 
Cir. 1986). 
155. 2 WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND, UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CoDE SERIES § 2-201:01, at 9-10 
(1992). 
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date than at the currently-prevailing rate.156 Therefore, DBS argues that a 
dollar-yen contract exists. The statute of frauds allows a court to avoid 
enforcing the alleged contract. 
Yet, a court need not apply the statute of frauds to achieve this result. 
A court can reason that the offer-acceptance process was not completed. 
The statement of "interest," even when coupled with the provision of deliv-
ery instructions, is not an acceptance ofDBS's offer to sell yen. Ostensibly, 
such reasoning is a doctrinal sleight-of-hand, that is, using contract forma-
tion rules to deal with enforceability problems. Any theoretical distinction 
between formation and enforceability, however, is of no practical moment 
to the Citibank trader. Whether a court decides that no valid contract 
ever was formed or that a contract exists but is unenforceable, the result is 
the same-Citibank has no obligation to buy 120 million yen.157 
As the Citibank-DBS example illustrates, the statute of frauds can de-
feat its own purpose.158 In effect, the statute of frauds is lop-sided. It is 
designed in part to prevent the fraudulent assertion of contractual claims, 
yet it allows a party to renege on a deal when an agreed price subsequently 
becomes unprofitable because of subsequent market developments. Eng-
lish law reformers have acknowledged this lop-sidedness. As Justice Wil-
mot's opinion (quoted at the outset of this Part) suggests, English jurists 
had complained for many years that the statute promotes fraud. The Eng-
lish Law Reform Committee finally agreed: 
"The Act," [the Statute of Frauds] in the words of Lord Campbell 
... "promotes more fraud than it prevents." True, it shuts out 
peijury; but it also and more frequently shuts out the truth. It 
strikes unpartially at the peijurer and at the honest man who has 
omitted a precaution, sealing the lips of both. Mr. Justice 
Fitzjames Stephen ... went so far as to assert that "in the vast 
majority of cases its operation is simply to enable a man to break 
a promise with impunity, because he did not write it down with 
sufficient formality."l59 
In 1954, almost three centuries after it first enacted the statute of frauds, 
Parliament repealed the statute.160 
156. DBS might cite U.C.C. § 2-204 in its favor, claiming sufficient appropriate conduct 
thereunder by Citibank to establish an agreement. 
157. The statute of frauds is unnecessary to prevent injustices in other types of cases. 
Suppose a wrongdoer claiming she is a Citibank trader telephones a DBS trader and asks for 
a dollar-yen quote. The DBS trader provides the quote, and the wrongdoer says "mine, 120 
million yen," thereby indicating a purchase of yen for dollars from DBS. The statute of 
frauds is a means for a court to ensure that the alleged contract is not enforced against 
Citibank. Citibank can argue, however, that under applicable agency law principles the 
wrongdoer Jacked authority to bind Citibank to an enforceable agreement. 
158. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
159. UNITED KINGDOM LAw REvisioN CoMMriTEE, SrxTH INTERIM REPORT, CMD. No. 5449, 
9 (1937), quoted in Misner, supra note 106, at 942-43; see also E. ALLAN FARNswORTH, CoN-
TRACTS§ 6.1, at 371-72 (1982). 
160. FARNswORTH, supra note 159, at 370-71; see also C. Grunfeld Law Reform (Enforcement 
of Contracts) Act, 1954, 17 Moo. L. REv. 451 (1954). For discussions of the history of the 
English statute of frauds pertaining to the sale of goods, see Thomson Printing Machinery 
Co. v. B. F. Goodrich Co., 714 F.2d 744 (7th Cir. 1983); Hugh E. Willis, The Statute of Frauds-
A Legal Anachronism, 3 Ind. LJ. 427, 429-32 (1928); George P. Costigan, The Date and Author-
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6. Results-Oriented Jurisprudence 
Admittedly, rejecting the tangibility paradigm and applying the prag-
matic strategy may amount to results-oriented jurisprudence inconsistent 
with the aims of the drafters of U.C.C. Article 2. Mter all, it would be 
incorrect to say the drafters intended the statute of frauds to be satisfied 
by a tape recording. The official commentary to section 2-201, as well as 
related definitional provisions in section 1-201(39) and 1-201(46), indi-
cate that the drafters took a paradigmatic pencil-and-paper approach. 161 
This objection, however, must be answered using two fundamental 
aims of the drafters. First, the U.C.C. should be interpreted flexibly in 
order to promote commercial development. Second, the freedom of par-
ties to contract with one another in a manner they find efficient should 
not be abridged. 162 The proposed legislative modifications and judicial 
re-interpretations call for Article 2 and the relevant definitions in Article 1 
to be changed in the light of technology and culture in the currency ba-
zaar. If legislatures adopt these changes, then the pragmatic justification 
for the inclusion of foreign exchange transactions in Article 2 is strength-
ened. Surely the drafters would prefer to see their sales law "work" for this 
market through some modest, constructive tinkering rather than wholly 
exempting the market from the law. 
Judge Posner-hardly an exponent of judicial activism-provided an 
illustration of useful tinkering consistent with the drafters' fundamental 
aims. In Monetti, S.P.A. v. Anchor Hocking Corporation, 163 he confronted the 
issue of whether a memo that precedes the actual formation of a contract 
constitutes a writing which satisfies section 2-201. Posner overcame the 
perfect tense contained in the statutory language, which says the writing 
must be sufficient to show that a contract "has been" made. The plain 
meaning is obvious: contract first, writing second. Nevertheless, Posner 
held that a pre-contractual writing that indicates acceptance of all the es-
sential terms of an offer satisfies section 2-201 (1) .164 Posner reasoned that 
a rule of strict temporal priority is unnecessary where one party unilater-
ally performs its obligations under the alleged contract. The plaintiff who 
sought to enforce the contract had conveyed all of its inventory, records, 
and other assets to the defendant who invoked the statute of frauds. This 
unilateral performance is unthinkable unless a contract exists. 
ship of the Statute of Frauds, 26 HARv. L. REv. 329 (1913); Crawford Henning, The OrignalDrafts 
of the Statute of Frauds and Their Authors, 61 U. PA. L. REv. 283 (1913); Justice Stephen & 
Frederick Pollack, Section Seventeen of the Statute of Frauds, 1 LAw. Q. REv. 1 (1885). 
161. U.C.C. §§ 2-201, 1-20I(39), I-20I(46). U.C.C. § 2-20I cmt. I states: 
The required writing need not contain all the material terms of the contract and 
such material terms as are stated need not be precisely stated. All that is required is 
that the writing afford a basis for believing that the offered oral evidence rests on a 
real transaction. It may be written in lead pencil on a scratch pad. 
This comment also indicates the drafters' aim to minimize the number of terms a "writing" 
must contain. See also Bazak Int'l Corp. v. Mast Industries, Inc., 538 N.Y.S.2d 503, 508 (I989); 
I STATE OF NEW YoRK, REPORT OF THE LAw REVIsiON CoMM'N FOR I954, at ll7-I8 (I954) 
(memorandum by K.N. Llewellyn). 
I62. See V.C.C. § I-I02(3) & cmt. 2; I HAWKlAND, supra note I55, § I-I02:I2 (I984). 
I63. 931 F.2d 1178, 1182 (7th Cir. I991). 
164. ld. at 1182, 1185. 
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Posner's flexible approach to the language of section 2-201 is applica-
ble to a tape-recorded spot foreign-exchange trade that lacks any eviden-
tiary writing. The partial performance exception to the statute of frauds, 
set forth in U.C.C. section 2-201(3)(c}, reinforces such an approach. 16 5 
That exception states that a contract that fails to satisfy section 2-201(1) 
"but which is valid in other respects is enforceable ... with respect to 
goods for which payment has been made and accepted or which have 
been received and accepted."166 Suppose DBS delivers 120 million yen to 
Citibank on the value date whereas Citibank fails to deliver $1,153,846.15. 
Without a contract, DBS would not deliver the yen, just as the plaintiff in 
Monetti would not have turned over its entire business to the defendant 
without a pre-existing (albeit oral) contract. Accordingly, a formalistic in-
terpretation of the writing requirement in the statute of frauds would be 
unwarranted. The only reasonable inference from the facts is that a con-
tract exists and should be enforced. In sum, Posner-like tinkering is justifi-
able in contexts where the facts, and the basic aims of the drafters, 
demand enforcement of an oral contract. 
C. Case Two: The Costs and Benefits of Confirmations 
1. The Tangibility Paradigm Again 
Case Two is a paradigmatic situation envisioned by section 2-201 (2): a 
deal made orally, evidenced by a subsequent confirmation slip. 167 Be-
cause the confirmations are unsigned or transmitted electronically, they 
do not comply with the requirements of U.C.C. section 2-201(1). How-
ever, the merchant's exception of section 2-201 (2) provides that: 
[b)etween merchants if within a reasonable time a writing in con-
firmation of the contract and sufficient against the sender is re-
ceived and the party receiving it has reason to know its contents, 
it satisfies the requirements of subsection (1) against such party 
unless written notice of objection to its contents is given within 
10 days after it is received. 168 
Strictly speaking, this provision is not an "exception" to the statute of 
frauds but rather "an alternate method of satisfying the writing require-
ment" of section 2-201(1) that is available for merchants.169 
165. Curiously, Posner does not discuss th!s exception in detail in the Monetti opinion. 
166. U.C.C. § 2-201 (3)(c). A three-pronged definition of "acceptance" is set forth in 
u.c.c. § 2-606. 
167. Monett~ 931 F.2d 1178; see also Mid-South Packers, Inc. v. Shoney's Inc., 761 F.2d 
1117 (5th Cir. 1985) (involving an oral offer to sell followed by a written invoice). The non-
paradigmatic situation is the reverse: a writing is prepared before the actual formation of the 
contract. See supra notes 163-66 and accompanying text. 
168. u.c.c. § 2-201(2). 
169. Migerobe, Inc. v. Certina USA, Inc., 924 F.2d 1330, 1334 (5th Cir. 1991). Accord-
ingly, some commentators provide a misleading explanation of U.C.C. § 2-201(2). See, e.g., 
Scarborough, supra note 108, at 20. 
A "merchant" is defined in U.C.C. § 2-104(1) as: 
a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupation holds him-
self out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in 
the transaction or to whom such knowledge or skill may be attributed by his employ-
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Accordingly, one way of satisfying the statute of frauds is to require a 
written confirmation between parties like Citibank and DBS.17° Case Two, 
then, involves the exchange of written confirmations between dealing 
banks after the banks' traders conclude their recorded telephonic com-
munication. The confirmations identify the currencies involved, the 
buyer and seller of the currencies, the exchange rate between the curren-
cies, the amount of currencies to be delivered, and the value date. A cost-
benefit analysis of the exchange of confirmations pursuant to the statute 
of frauds indicates that requiring this exchange does not serve the needs 
of the market. 
Llewellyn envisioned parties like Citibank and DBS making contracts 
by telephone: 
These days we are making contracts over the long-distance 
telephone as an increasingly standard practice. Decent business-
men having made a contract over the long-distance telephone 
confirm before five o'clock or close of business that day. As the 
statute now stands, any crook who wishes to play it both ways 
against the middle has only to fail to communicate [i.e., to an-
swer the counterparty] and the other guy is stuck. He can hold 
him or get out according to the market. 
This happy opportunity for fraud is unfortunately being in-
dulged in to a considerable extent. 
We think that the machinery provided in the section [sec-
tion 2-201 (2)], not by any means wholly satisfactory, at least is a 
safeguard against this particular type of abuse and fits the prac-
tice of constantly closing deals at a distance, and orally. 171 
ment of an agent or broker or other intermediary who by his occupation holds 
himself out as having such knowledge or skill. 
Surely, Citibank and DBS are merchants because they deal in currency, satisfy the 
"knowledge or skill" test, or meet the attribution tesL 
There is no bright-line test for what constitutes a "reasonable time." It "depends on the 
nature, purpose and circumstances" of the action that is required. U.C.C. § 1-204(2). Be-
cause of the short-term volatility of exchange rates, a "reasonable time" may be a shorter 
period in the context of the currency bazaar than in other markets. See, e.g., Lish v. 
Compton, 547 P.2d 223, 227 {Utah 1976) (holding that twelve days was not a "reasonable 
time" with respect to the wheat market in which prices fluctuated rapidly). 
The correct approach to U.C.C. § 2-201(2) appears to be that it is an exception to the 
signature requirement, not the writing requirement. U.C.C. § 2-201 (2) states that a writing 
must be "sufficient against the sender." This phrase implies that while a written confirmation 
is required, the signature of the recipient on the confirmation is not needed. To enforce a 
con tract, the sender of a confirmation must produce that confirmation and must have signed 
it; but the sender need not also show that the recipient signed the confirmation. In other 
words, to deprive the confirmation recipient of the statute of frauds defense, the confirma-
tion need only be signed by the sender and indicate the existence of a contract. If the recipi-
ent receives the confirmation and does not make a timely objection to it, the recipient loses 
the statute of frauds defense. Therefore, U.C.C. § 2-201 (2) excuses the need for the recipi-
ent of a confirmation to sign the confirmation. 
170. See, e.g., Lambert Corp. v. Evans, 575 F.2d 132 (7th Cir. 1978) (holding that written 
confirmation of an oral telephone contract satisfied § 2-201). See generally FARNSWORTH, supra 
note 159, § 6.7, at 405 (1982) (stating that "the usual way to satisfy the statute [offrauds] is 
still by a signed writing, commonly called a 'memorandum'"). 
171. 1 STATE OF NEw YoRK, REPoRT OF THE LAw REviSION CoMM'N FOR 1954 179. 
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But, like Misner, Llewellyn could not overcome the tangibility paradigm. 
In fact, Llewellyn successfully advocated the adoption of section 2-201 (2). 
Yet, contrary to Llewellyn's view, there is nothing indecent about conclud-
ing a deal by telephone without exchanging written confirmations. 
Llewellyn and Misner are not alone in defending the tangibility para-
digm. The leading advocate of the use of written confirmations, as well as 
the exclusion of foreign exchange transactions from U.C.C. Article 2, is 
the Federal Reserve. Acting through the Foreign Exchange Committee 
("FEC") -an informal advisory group of roughly thirty U.S. and foreign 
commercial and investment banks and foreign exchange brokers-the 
Federal Reserve repeatedly encourages market participants to exchange 
written confirmations.172 The FEC "believes that the practice of confirm-
ing trades by personnel other than traders is the best protection against 
misdirected trades, payments problems, and other potentially costly mis-
takes as well as a deterrent to unauthorized dealing."173 
In spite of the doubt cast below on written confirmations, the FEC 
continues to advocate the exchange of confirmations.174 A possible expla-
nation for this intransigence is the regulatory influence of the Federal Re-
serve on the FEC. The Federal Reserve is responsible for supervising many 
of the commercial banks (and their holding companies) that participate 
172. See, e.g., FEC 1992, supra note 14, at 9; FoREIGN ExcHANGE CoMMriTEE, 1990 ANNUAL 
REPORT 5 (1991) [hereinafter FEC 1990]; FoREIGN ExcHANGE CoMMITrEE,"1989 ANNUAL RE-
PORT 9 (1990) [hereinafter FEC 1989]. 
173. FEC 1990, supra note 172, at 5. Accordingly, the IFEMA, which was drafted by the 
Financial Market Lawyers Group of the FEC, states that foreign exchange transactions gov-
erned by the IFEMA "shall be promptly confirmed by the Parties by Confirmations ex-
changed by mail, telex, facsimile or other electronic means." IFEMA, supra note 14, § 2.3. 
Section 8.15 of the IFEMA, allows parties to agree on a specific timing for the exchange, 
checking, and challenge of confirmations. Absent manifest error, confirmations are deemed 
correct three business days after receipt by a party. An example of manifest error would be 
where there is a conflict between the confirmation and a tape recording of the conversation 
between traders. See IFEMA GumE, supra note 14, §III. C. at 7. Under§ 8.3 of the IFEMA, a 
tape recording is the preferred evidence of the terms of a transaction. The definition of 
"Confirmation" in § 1 of the IFEMA lists the elements that should be included in the docu-
ment. But, no sample confirmation form is appended to the IFEMA because no single for-
mat is accepted in the foreign exchange market as a standard. IFEMA GuiDE, supra note 14, 
§ III.C, at 8. Breach of the obligation to send a confirmation, however, carries no penalty; 
failure to exchange confirmations "shall not prejudice or invalidate" any foreign exchange 
transaction. /d. 
174. See infra notes 176-216 and accompanying text. As the FEC recently reaffirmed: 
Nevertheless, the [Foreign Exchange] Committee felt strongly that written confirma-
tions were still necessary and that tapes did not provide a sufficiently secure and 
continuous alternative record .... [I]n [a] ... letter to foreign exchange market 
participants responding to the CIB proposal ... , the Committee emphasized that it 
is as necessary as ever to have timely, written confirmations for all spot deals with 
banks and other dealers. 
FEC 1990 supra note 172, at 5-6. 
The only modification to this position concerns the means of transmitting confirma-
tions. The Federal Reserve now acknowledges that transmitting confirmations in a timely 
manner, namely, electronically, by telex, or fax, is preferable to sending them in the mail. 
FEC 1990, supra note 172, at 6, 29; see also FEC 1992, supra note 14, at 9. Electronic transmis-
sion occurs through one of two linkages among trading banks: the Society for Worldwide 
Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIIT) system or a direct-dealing system. While 
such transmissions would entail a transaction cost, at least they would be available before the 
value date of a spot transaction. 
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in the foreign exchange market. 175 The Federal Reserve may suspect that 
the foreign exchange market is plagued by questionable and possibly ille-
gal trading practices that threaten the safety and soundness of the partici-
pants it supervises. Written confirmations provide the Federal Reserve 
with an "audit trail," that is, potential evidence of improper practices. De-
termined wrongdoers, however, will not hesitate to falsify records. Hence, 
the practical value of written confirmations for Federal regulators and law 
enforcement agencies is limited. Tape recordings of traders' and brokers' 
conversations are themselves audit trails. 
2. Delays and Costs 
Exchanging confirmations is by no means a universal practice in the 
foreign exchange market. Many market participants find it time-consum-
ing and costly. Traders seek to conclude their transactions quickly. It is 
infeasible to require traders to spend much time confirming their trades. 
After concluding one deal over the phone, their attention turns immedi-
ately to the next deal. Not surprisingly, the task of confirming-if it is 
performed-is left to the trading bank's operations department. The 
main point, however, is that the merchants exception provides little help 
to traders. In effect, the statute of frauds "interfere[s] with expeditious 
contracting by delaying mutual obligation from legally attaching until 
some later time." 176 
In addition to these delays, exchanging confirmations entails prepara-
tory, transmission, and storage costs. Preparatory costs are those con-
nected with the preparation of the confirmation. The officials in the 
operations department of Citibank and DBS must ascertain the terms of 
the trade (e.g., the currencies involved, exchange rates, value date, and 
delivery instructions) by listening to the tape recorded conversations of 
the traders, talking with the traders, and checking any written records like 
trade tickets. The officials must be paid for their time and effort. Sending 
the prepared confirmation via mail, telex, or fax entails a transmission 
cost. While this cost may be small for a single confirmation, the fact that 
Citibank and DBS enter into hundreds of deals every day means that the 
cumulative transmission cost could be significant. Finally, cautious market 
participants may seek to store confirmations for the statute of limitations 
period. Under U.C.C. section 2-725(1), the statute of limitations for an 
action involving a contract for sale is four years from the date the claim 
accrues. Either the writings must be stored in a warehouse, leading to 
inventory and property costs, or converted to microfiche, resulting in stor-
age costs. The sum of preparatory, transmission, and storage costs is a 
sizeable transaction cost connected with every foreign exchange trade. 177 
175. Under the Bank Holding Company Act, the Federal Rese!Ve has supervisory author-
ity over all bank holding companies. 12 U.S.C. § 1841 (1988). It is also responsible for su-
pervising commercial banks that are state-chartered and members of the Federal ReseiVe 
System. 12 U.S.C. § 1813(q) (1988) (defining "appropriate Federal banking agency"). 
176. Misner, supra note 106, at 945. 
177. As the FEC admits: 
42 DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:1 
Curiously, in Monetti,Judge Posner observed that one purpose of the 
statute of frauds is "to make the contractual process cheaper and more 
certain by encouraging the parties to contracts to memorialize their agree-
ment."178 Posner, however, failed to elaborate on this purpose. It could 
be that compliance with the statute of frauds leads to less litigation and, 
thus, greater certainty and lower legal costs.179 Here, the statute of frauds 
acts in tandem with the parol evidence rule set forth in U.C.C. section 2-
202. By forcing parties to reduce their deal to a writing, the terms thereof 
will be recorded. Parties will not have to rely on their memories or notes 
to check the terms. Because such sources are potentially inconsistent, reli-
ance thereon could generate uncertainty. Thus, prudent parties might 
not only reduce their agreement to writing, but also include a merger 
clause to ensure their agreement is integrated.180 
If this logic is what Posner had in mind, then it seems to be under-
mined by the statute of frauds itself. As discussed below, exactly what a 
document must contain to be a "writing" and to satisfy section 2-201 (1) is 
unclear. 181 Accordingly, if disputes about the terms of the transaction 
arise, then surely the parties will rely on the tape recorded conversations 
of their transaction for guidance. 182 Yet, if the tape is the key evidentiary 
means for resolving disputed trades, then why bother with a writing in the 
first place? 
Some banks operate on the assumption that confirmation for a spot trade by a 
recorded telephone conversation is adequate as long as the contracts settle; they 
retain written confirmations only for use in the case of a disputed or failed trade. 
These banks have adopted this procedure in order to reduce office costs. They are 
willing to accept the risk that their more informal confirmation procedures may 
expose them to a larger number of misdirected spot trades. 
FEC 1989, supra note 172, at 9 (emphasis added). The FEC's view that reliance on tape 
recordings exposes banks to greater risk is questioned below. 
178. Monetti, S.P.A. v. Anchor Hocking Corp., 931 F.2d at 1181. 
179. See, e.g., DF Activities Corp. v. Brown, 851 F.2d at 925 (Flaum, J., dissenting). In-
deed, in Monetti Posner cites Professor Farnsworth's treatise in support of the proposition 
that the statute of frauds "is largely based on distrust of the ability of juries to determine the 
truth of testimony that there was or was not a contract." Monetti, 931 F.2d at 1181 (citing 
FARNSWORTH, supra note 159, § 6.1, at 85 (1990)). The inference that Posner draws from this 
proposition is that it is more costly, and the outcome Jess certain, to leave this determination 
to a jury than to memorialize an agreement in writing. An alternative-and not necessarily 
inconsistent-inference is that a jury is less competent than the parties (or a judge) to make 
the determination. 
180. This clause (also called an integration clause) is designed to prevent inconsistent 
sources from undermining the integrity of the agreement because of the parol evidence rule. 
See gmerally 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 98, § 7.3. 
181. See infra notes 232-35 and accompanying text. 
182. Disputes about representations and warranties are unlikely because the participants 
are likely to be well-known to each other and to have dealt with each other on several previ-
ous occasions. A dispute could arise about the designated account to which the yen are to be 
delivered. Reference to the tape-recorded conversation of the traders might be fruitless in 
resolving this dispute. Officials of the operations departments of Citibank and DBS, and not 
the banks' traders, would be responsible for exchanging delivery instructions. Referral to 
their oral or written communications would be necessary. 
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3. Practical Irrelevance 
There are very few benefits to requiring the exchange of written con-
firmations that offset the aforementioned delays. The FEC argues that 
"[c]onfirmations are an important defense against error and fraud." 183 
The comments above regarding fraud promotion rebut this argument. 184 
Moreover, the alleged benefit assumes that confirmations are, in fact, ex-
changed promptly. Suppose Citibank sends a written confirmation to DBS 
on November 1. DBS, which has reason to know of the contents of the 
confirmation, fails to respond to the confirmation by November 10. The 
confirmation would satisfy the writing requirementofsection 2-201(1). 185 
By failing to answer Citibank's written confirmation, DBS loses the defense 
of the statute of frauds, but Citibank must still prove that an oral contract 
was made prior to the written confirmation. 186 
As a practical matter, however, this result would be irrelevant. The 
value date of the spot transaction is November 3, and therefore, the dollar 
and yen legs should settle on that date. Thus, while confirmations ex-
changed by mail among foreign exchange market participants satisfy sec-
tion 2-201(2), they rarely, if ever, arrive in time to identify problems 
before the value date of a spot transaction. 187 Not surprisingly, in 1989 
the U.S. Council on International Banking ("CIB") recommended that 
banks discontinue the exchange of confirmations by mail because the 
practice serves no practical purpose. ISS 
The only way to detect an error before November 3 would be to check 
the tape recording of the traders' oral agreement or to exchange confir-
mations electronically, by telex, or by fax on November 1 or 2. Again, 
written confirmations transmitted by these swift means are unnecessary 
where tape recordings of that transaction exist. The CIB's recommenda-
tion correctly pointed out that taped telephone conversations are a more 
efficient method of detecting problems with a trade. 189 They are immedi-
ately available for use by the operations departments. 
4. Helping the Sophisticated 
Given the trusting nature of currency bazaar participants, it is not sur-
prising that many foreign exchange traders find written confirmations un-
necessary. After all, repeat players are unlikely to attempt to defraud one 
another for fear of being ostracized from the marketplace. Citibank's at-
tempt to renege on its agreement with DBS jeopardizes Citibank's own 
standing in the market. The foreign exchange market has been character-
ized (in gender-biased terms) as a "gentleman's market" where "a trader's 
I83. IFEMA GumE, supra note I4, § III.C, at 7. 
I84. See supra notes I52-60 and accompanying text. 
I85. The same writing standard set forth in U.C.C. § 2-20I cmt. I applies to sub-sections 
(I) and (2) of§ 2-201. See, e.g., Bazak Int'l Corp. v. Mast Indus. Inc., 538 N.Y.S.2d 503, 508 
(1989). 
I86. U.C.C. § 2-20I cmt. 3. 
I87. FEC I990, supra note I72, at 5. 
I88. /d.. 
I89. /d. 
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word is his bond." When the DBS trader responds "120 million yen, yours, 
at 104," a deal is struck. To renege is to lose credibility. 
Overall, market participants police themselves by refusing to deal with 
those who cannot be trusted to fulfill obligations to which they have com-
mitted verbally. Because the market has been generally free from the mal-
adies of fraud and deceit, this self-regulating· mechanism has worked. 
Rigid adherence to section 2-201 (2) is, therefore, unnecessary. 
This point leads to a reconsideration of one of the purposes of the 
statute of frauds, namely, precluding the enforceability of contractual 
claims where a party does not knowingly assume a contractual obliga-
tion.190 The hidden presumption is that parties are unsophisticated and 
need protection from wandering unwittingly into a legally enforceable ob-
ligation. Yet, foreign exchange market participants hardly need such pro-
tection. They are large commercial and investment banks, corporations, 
and investment funds. Not surprisingly, they are acutely aware not only of 
the risks of trading in the currency bazaar, but also of how trades are nego-
tiated, executed, and consummated. 
5. The Tension with the Parol Evidence Rule 
Written confirmations are not only irrelevant in practice and unnec-
essary for the sophisticated market participants of the currency bazaar, but 
they are also potentially dangerous. Insofar as the contractual terms in 
them are inconsistent with those stated in the tape recorded telephone 
conversations, they may generate problems of parol evidence. Suppose 
the dollar-yen transaction between Citibank and DBS is a thirty-day for-
ward purchase of yen entered into on November 1, i.e., the value date is 
November 30.191 The operations department official of Citibank records 
the terms of the transaction; however, instead of indicating that 120 mi_l-
lion yen are purchased, she records that yen are sold. This confirmation is 
sent to DBS within a reasonable time, and DBS does not send an objection 
to the confirmation within ten days after it is received. Pursuant to U.C.C. 
section 2-201 (2), the formal requirements of section 2-201 (1) are met. 
While enforceability is not an issue, what exactly should be enforced 
is in doubt. On the value date, Citibank demands $1,153,846.15 from 
DBS, which replies that Citibank is entitled to 120 million yen. Plainly, 
Citibank's written confirmation is incorrect. It is certain to be inconsistent 
with the tape recording of the conversation between the Citibank and DBS 
traders. It also may be inconsistent with Citibank's deal ticket. To ascer-
tain whether Citibank bought, instead of sold, yen, the operations depart-
ment officials of the two banks must speak with each other, examine their 
deal tickets, and check the confirmations against the tape recordings and 
deal tickets. 
The point is that the greater the number of sources which evidence 
the agreement, the greater the probability of inconsistencies in the 
190. See, e.g., Scarborough, supra note 108, at 22. 
191. For a discussion of fmward transactions, see supra note 17. 
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sources. Requiring more confirmations of a trade is not necessarily a safe-
guard against error. To the contrary, it can foster errors, thus exacerbat-
ing risk and confusion in the currency bazaar.192 Had the parties relied 
on the tape recordings, the mess may have been averted. This scenario is 
hardly far-fetched. Indeed, its facts resemble those in Intershoe, Inc. v. 
Bankers Trust Co. 193 Moreover, as one foreign exchange market observer 
stated, "[t]here cannot be any market dealer anywhere who has never 
done a deal 'the wrong way round', or for the wrong amount, or the 
wrong value date, or some other major error at some time."194 
In this Citibank-DBS dispute, the parol evidence rule of section 2-202 
must be applied to determine the terms of the transaction. 195 This appli-
cation yields two principal difficulties. First, the methodology used when 
applying this rule is uncertain. Second, the rule can produce erroneous 
results. 
With respect to methodology, the Court must decide whether Ci-
tibank's written confirmation is the final expression of the parties with 
respect to the terms of their agreement. Then, the court must decide 
whether the confirmation constitutes an integrated agreement. Assuming 
the writing itself does not indicate that it is or is not the complete, conclu-
sive statement of the terms, the Court must make this determination. To 
be sure, the standard the Court must apply under Article 2 is clearer than 
192. It can also foster disputes about whether the contents of a document are adequate to 
allow a court to conclude that the document constitutes a writing for purposes of the statute 
of frauds. See, e.g., Levin v. Knight, 780 F.2d 786, 790 (9th Cir: 1986) (concerning whether a 
written memorandum contained enough of the essential terms, with sufficient specificity, to 
evidence a con tract). 
193. In Inters/we, 569 N.Y.S.2d 333 (N.Y. 1991), a shoe importer, Intershoe, entered into 
thirty-week dollar-Italian lira forward transactions with Bankers Trust. (The court errone-
ously referred to these transactions as "futures." Because they took place in the over-the-
counter market and not on an organized exchange, they are forwards. See Bhala supra note 2, 
at 100). Bankers Trust sent Intershoe a confirmation indicating that it had bought 
537,750,000 lira from, and sold $250,000 to, Intershoe. Intershoe signed the confirmation 
and returned it to Bankers Trust. Just before the delivery date, Intershoe said that it had 
bought, not sold, lira. Intershoe's attempt to introduce a supporting affidavit was rebuffed by 
virtue of Section 2-202. The court found the confirmation to be the final expression of the 
parties' agreement. Inters/we, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 335. 
Curiously, while the disputed transactions were negotiated and concluded by telephone, 
the court did not refer to the tape recordings of the parties' conversations. Moreover, the 
court's dicta that "a confirmation slip or similar writing is usually the only reliable evidence 
of such transactions," id. at 336-37, is factually erroneous. 
194. JOHN HEYWOOD, fOREIGN EXCHANGE AND THE CoRPORATE TREASURER 109 (2d ed. 
1979). 
195. U.C.C. § 2-202 states: 
Terms with respect to which the confirmatory memoranda of the parties agree or 
which are otherwise set forth in a writing intended by the parties as a final expres-
sion of their agreement with respect to such terms as are included therein may not be 
contradicted by evidence of any priur agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agreement 
but may be explained or supplemented 
(a) by course of dealing or usage of trade ... or by course of performance; and 
(b) by evidence of consistent additional terms unless the court finds the writ-
ing to have been intended also as a complete and exclusive statement of the 
terms of the agreement. 
(emphasis added). 
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under the common law. 196 Official comment 3 to section 2-202 states that 
extrinsic evidence of contractual terms must be excluded "[i]f the addi-
tional terms are such that, if agreed upon, they would certainly have been 
included in the document."19 7 
Unfortunately, the U.C.C. Article 2 standard may be non-sensical and 
lead to uncertain results in a dispute such as that between Citibank-DBS 
where one party has confused the deal. Surely if Citibank had agreed to 
sell yen, then it would have stated so in the confirmation; consequently, 
tape recordings must be excluded from consideration. Yet, in fact, selling 
yen is exactly what Citibank agreed to do, as the tape recordings can 
prove. Citibank did not state it sold yen because of a clerk's innocent 
error in making the confirmation, the dishonesty of a trader in writing a 
deal ticket, or some other reason. Thus, on the one hand, a court might 
hold the Citibank confirmation is not an integration and, therefore, ex-
trinsic evidence such as the tape recording should be admitted. 198 But, on 
the other hand, following a strict construction of the test in official com-
ment 3, a court could come to the opposite conclusion. In sum, because 
application of the parol evidence rule may yield inconsistent results in sim-
ilar cases, the important goal of providing certainty and predictability to 
foreign exchange market participants is lost. 19 9 
196. One common law test, proposed by Professor Williston, focuses on whether reason-
able parties, situated as were the parties to this contract, would have naturally and normally 
included the extrinsic matter in the writing. 4 SAMUEL WILUSTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF 
CoNTRAcrs §§ 638-39 (3d ed. 1961). Williston's test leads to the result that merger clauses 
usually are conclusive evidence of the completeness of a writing. 
Professor Corbin advocated a two-step inquiry, not an objective "reasonable person" test. 
The judge should consider extrinsic materials to determine whether there is "respectable" 
evidence that an antecedent agreement was made. If so, then the judge should determine 
whether the antecedent agreement was discharged by the subsequent writing. 3 ARTHUR L. 
CoRBIN, CoRBIN oN CoNTRAcrs § 582 (1960); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcrs 
§§ 210(3), 214 (1981). Under Corbin's test, a merger clause is only one item of evidence 
weighed against other facts. 
Yet another test, found in Sections 229 and 230 of the RESTATEMENT (FrRST) OF CoN-
TRAcrs (1932), asks whether reasonable persons in the parties' situation would have included 
the disputed provision in the contract. 
Not surprisingly, Professor Murray, while discerning a movement toward the Corbin test, 
concluded that the case law "has been generally ineffective in articulating a workable ration-
ale .. _ ." joHN E. MuRRAY, MuRRAY ON CoNTRAcrs § 107, at 235-36 (2d rev. ed. 1974) (foot-
note omitted). 
197. U_C.C. § 2-202 cmt. 3 (emphasis added). This comment is commended as a "consis-
tent starting point" that improves on the common law. See, e.g., Manire, supra note 7, at 1204. 
U.C.C. § 2-202 manifests Uewellyn's approach to the problem of deciding whether a writing 
is integrated. 
198. One ground for this conclusion could be that Citibank's confirmation is "merely to 
furnish an aid to the writer's recollection." 9 JoHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRtALS AT CoM-
MON LAw§ 2429, at 96 (Chadbourn rev. 1981). A different ground could be that the confir-
mation is designed solely to satisfY the statute offrauds under U.C.C. § 2-201(2). Some cases 
have adopted this approach. See, e.g., Southern States Dev. Co. v. Robinson, 494 S.W.2d 777, 
782 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1972) (holding that if a memorandum meets the Statute of Frauds, the 
entire contract may be explained and proved by parol evidence); Nathan v. Spector, 120 
N.Y.S.2d 358, (N.Y. App. Div. 1953) (holding that parol evidence may even be used to deter-
mine whether a memorandum meets the Statute of Frauds). 
199. An interesting question is whether reformation of the terms stated in the confirma-
tion is possible based on the tape recordings. 
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Strangely, neither the Intershoe nor IBJ courts applied the "would cer-
tainly" standard. In addition, neither court explained why it rejected this 
standard.2°0 Both courts were inevitably dragged into fact-specific inquir-
ies, but each court emphasized different facts. The Intershoe court focused 
on the terms stated in the confirmation itself.201 In effect, it applied the 
four-corners test, looking only at the writing to decide its completeness. 
The IB] court examined all the evidence of completeness and exclusivity, 
including evidence beyond the writing. It considered the intention of the 
parties, the history of their negotiations and relationship, and the omis-
sion of a signature from the confirmations. 202 
Not only did each court highlight different facts, but they also ren-
dered diametrically opposed judgments. In Intershoe the parol evidence 
rule barred out extrinsic evidence, while in IBJ such evidence was admit-
ted. Consequently, these cases have created considerable uncertainty in 
the currency bazaar. Participants cannot predict exactly how a court 
might analyze whether a confirmation is an integrated agreement or the 
likely result. Suppose the Court determines that Citibank's written confir-
mation is an integration of the agreement. The second difficulty resulting 
from the application of section 2-202 is that it leads to an erroneous result. 
The tape recording cannot be introduced as evidence because it contra-
dicts the confirmation. The result is that incorrect contractual terms are 
enforced, namely, that Citibank delivers rather than receives yen. DBS was 
in the best position to correct the confirmation but failed to do so. This 
factor, however, should not be dispositive. 
200. One possibility arises from a close reading of U.C.C. § 2-202 cmt. 3, which refers to 
subsection (b). The comment indicates that the court should focus on whether the parties 
intended the writing to be a complete and conclusive statement of all the terms. If the par-
ties so intended, then evidence of consistent additional terms must be kept from the trier of 
fact. 
201. 569 N.Y.S.2d 333, 336. The facts of the case are discussed supra note 193. 
202. /Bj. supra note 45, at 422-23. In IB]. a Chilean company, Compania Sud-Americana 
de Vapores (CSAV) received foreign currencies in payment for its shipping services. The 
currencies were deposited in an account maintained by IBJ Schroder Bank & Trust ("Schro-
der"), which was responsible for converting the currencies into U.S. dollars and crediting 
CSAV's account with Schroder. Schroder confirmed each currency conversion transaction 
with CSAV. The gravamen of CSAV's complaint was that Schroder charged exchange rates 
that were in excess of spot market rates. /d. at 415-16. 
These facts are distinguishable from those in lntershoe in certain key respects. lntershoe 
involved a written confirmation of a single transaction. The confirmation was an integrated 
document that reflected the terms to which the parties had agreed over the telephone. Con-
sequently, the parol evidence rule barred the admission of extrinsic evidence to supplement 
or alter the terms of the transaction. Intershoe, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 337. IB] involved a large 
number of currency conversions, and CSAV did not telephone Schroder to negotiate and 
conclude these transactions. Rather, the currency conversions were performed by Schroder 
pursuant to a prior overarching management agreement made with CSAV. The confirma-
tions of each conversion were not intended to reflect this agreement. Hence, the parol evi-
dence rule could not bar extrinsic evidence about its terms. IB]. supra note 45, at 432. 
The fact that lntershoe involved one confirmation whereas IBJ involved several is irrele-
vant for purposes of applying the parol evidence rule. A final expression of an agreement 
may be manifested in one or more documents. WHITE & SuMMERS, supra note 53, § 2-10, at 
98. Accordingly, the decision in B.N.E., Swedbank, S.A. v. Banker, 794 F. Supp. 1291, 
(S.D.N.Y. 1992), aff'd, 996 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1993), is suspect. The B.N.E. court stated that 
lntershoe was irrelevant because it involved a single document whereas the case at hand in-
volved several confirmation slips. /d. at 1292. 
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The effect of the parol evidence rule is "to give preference to the 
written version of [the] terms [of a contract]. "203 The justification for this 
preference is that "[w]ritings are more reliable than memories to show 
contract terms, and forgery is supposedly easier to detect than is lying on 
the witness stand."2°4 Many critics of the rule emphasize that it is inconsis-
tent with conventional processes of proof-juries should be allowed to 
hear all relevant evidence.205 The criticism is even more poignant in the 
context of the currency bazaar where the conversation between the con-
tracting parties is tape recorded. Obviously, a tape recording is the most 
reliable evidence of the transaction terms. The parol evidence rule com-
pels a court to behave like an ostrich with its head in the sand. Applica-
tion of the rule may specifically exclude the one form of evidence that can 
conclusively resolve whether Citibank bought or sold yen. 
In sum, there is a tension between section 2-201 (2) and the parol 
evidence rule. The former can be satisfied with a written confirmation to 
which there is no objection. The confirmation, however, generates a po-
tential problem under section 2-202. It may transform the most reliable 
evidence of the transaction, the tape recording, into parol evidence. 
Therefore, the use of tapes to resolve disputes about terms becomes 
uncertain. 
6. The Tension with the Battle of the Forms Rule 
A similar tension exists between U.C.C. section 2-201 (2) and Article 
2's provision on the battle of the forms, section 2-207. Suppose both Ci-
tibank and DBS issue and exchange written confirmations on the trade 
date, November 1, after they reach an oral agreement evidenced by a tape 
recording.206 These confirmations, printed on each bank's standard 
form, conflict. Citibank's confirmation says that it bought 120 million yen 
for value on November 30, whereas DBS's confirmation says that the value 
date is November 3. DBS does not notify Citibank of any objection to the 
terms of Citibank's confirmation, but on November 3 it sends 120 million 
yen to Citibank and asks Citibank for the reciprocal delivery of 
$1,153,846.15. Citibank objects, saying the deal involved the forward, not 
spot, sale of yen. 207 
203. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 53, § 2-9, at 95. 
204. /d. 
205. /d. at 95 & n.3. 
206. The above hypothetical is a combination of Cases (I) and (6) in WHITE & SuMMERS, 
supra note 53, § 1-3, at 30-36, 43-46. See also Douglas G. Baird & George Weisberg, Rules, 
Standards, and the Battle of the Forms; A Reassessment of Section 2-207, 68 VA. L. REv. 1217-19 
(1982) (discussing the scenarios to which the battle of the forms refers). For a recent survey 
of proposed revisions to U.C.C. § 2-207, see Ending the "Battle of the Forms": A Symposium on the 
Revision of Section 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 49 Bus. LAw. 1019 (1994). Except for 
the additional fact regarding the tape recording, the hypothetical is one of the two paradig-
matic cases that U.C.C. § 2-207 is designed to deal with: "the written confirmation [situa-
tion], where an agreement has been reached either orally or by informal correspondence 
between the parties and is followed by one or both of the parties sending formal memoranda 
embodying the terms so far as agreed upon and adding terms not discussed." U.C.C. § 2-207 
cmt. I. 
207. See supra note 17 regarding forward transactions. 
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Here the problem is the battle of the forms and application of section 
2-207. Assuming the confirmations do not constitute an integrated agree-
ment, if the terms of the Citibank and DBS confirmations conflict or if 
one confirmation omits a term that the other includes, then a court must 
determine which terms are part of the contract.208 Applying section 2-207 
again highlights the importance of the tape recorded conversation and 
the disruption caused by the very use of written confirmations.209 
Because the confirmations state different delivery dates, the threshold 
question is whether section 2-207 (2) covers different as well as additional 
contractual terms.210 The answer is uncertain. Even though U.C.C. sec-
tion 2-207(1) expressly refers to "different" terms, section 2-207(2) does 
not contain this language. "[T]he drafters could easily have inserted 'or 
different' if they had so intended."211 Official comment 3 to U.C.C. sec-
tion 2-207 and some case law, however, do indicate that different terms are 
covered.212 
Assuming section 2-207(2) governs, its application is problematic. 
One interpretation is that the language "additional term" means "addi-
tional or different terms." Interpreted this way, U.C.C. sections 2-
207(2) (b) and (c) indicate that an additional term automatically becomes 
part of the contract unless (i) that term "materially alter[s]" the contract 
or (ii) the recipient of the confirmation with the additional term objects 
to it within a "reasonable time" after receiving the confirmation. Because 
DBS failed to answer Citibank's confirmation "within a reasonable time 
after additional terms were proposed, it is both fair and commercially 
208. Note that U.C.C. § 2-202 automatically construes the writings as integrated to the 
extent that they agree on certain terms. See, e.g., Luria Bros. & Co. v. Pielet Bros. Scrap Iron 
& Metal,Inc., 600 F.2d 103 (7th Cir. 1979). Note also that U.C.C. § 2-207 has received consid-
erable scholarly criticism. See, e.g., Charles M. Thatcher, Battle of the Forms: Solution by Revision 
of Section 2-207, 6 UCC LJ. 237,240 (1984) (arguing that§ 2-207 has "discouraged the expan-
sion of commercial practices through custom, usage, and agreement of the parties" and 
yielded "unsettled case law and consequent lack of uniformity .... "); W. David Slawson, The 
New Meaning of Contract: The Transfurmation of Contracts Law by Standard Forms, 46 U. Prrr. L. 
REv. 21, 59 (1984) (arguing that offer and acceptance forms can be drafted to prevent the 
making of a contract, with the result that the common law mirror-image rule is reinstated); 
Baird & Weisberg, supra note 206 (arguing that§ 2-207 is so vague that it leaves a number or 
questions unresolved). 
209. According to the common law mirror image rule, one confirmation (presumably the 
first one sent) would be treated as an offer, while the other confirmation would be an effec-
tive acceptance only if it did not vary the terms of the offer. 1 REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CoNTRAcTS §§ 58-60 (1979); see also WHITE & SuMMERS, supra note 53, § 1-3, at 29-30. Be-
cause such a variation exists in the Citibank-DBS case, one of the confirmations would be 
treated as a counter-offer. To decide the terms of the contract, the Court would examine 
evidence of a prior oral agreement, including the tape recordings. 
210. This section may be particularly relevant to the dispute because Citibank and DBS 
are "merchants." See supra note 169. 
211. WHITE & SuMMERS, supra note 53, § 1-3, at 32 (footnote omitted). 
212. U.C.C. § 2-207(1) operates automatically to convert a confirmation with different 
terms as a proposal for an addition to the contract. Official comment 3 indicates that 
" [ w] hether or not additional or different terms will become part of the agreement depends on 
the provisions of subsection (2)." U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 3 (emphasis added); see also Westing-
house Electric Corp. v. Nielsons, Inc., 647 F. Supp. 896, 900 (D. Colo. 1986); Steiner v. Mobil 
Oil Corp., 569 P.2d 751 (Cal. 1977) (holding that§ 2-207(2) applies to different and addi-
tional terms). But see WHITE & SuMMERS, supra note 53,§ 1-3, at 32 nn.ll-12. 
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sound to assume that their inclusion has been assented to."213 The trans-
action, regardless of what the Citibank and DBS traders agreed to on tape, 
becomes a yen forward unless DBS persuades a court that the November 
30 delivery date is a material alteration of the contract. Thus, the Ci-
tibank-DBS dispute becomes one of materiality of the delivery term. 
This result is unsatisfactory. "Materiality" is a fact-specific determina-
tion that may involve protracted litigation.214 While official comment 4 to 
U.C.C. section 2-207 provides limited guidance on what constitutes a "ma-
terial alteration," the statute itself is silent on the matter. Thus, there is no 
guarantee of consistent results in other like cases. 
An alternative and preferable approach to the application of section 
2-207 (2) is to focus on the advice provided in official comment 6: 
Where clauses on confirming forms sent by both parties conflict 
each party must be assumed to object to a clause of the other con-
flicting with one on the confirmation sent by himself. As a result 
the requirement that there be notice of objection which is found 
in subsection (2) is satisfied and the conflicting terms do not be-
come part of the contract. The contract then consists of the terms 
originally expressly agreed to, terms on which the confirmations 
agree, and terms supplied by this Act, including subsection (2). 
The written confirmation is also subject to Section 2-201. Under 
that section a failure to respond permits enforcement of a prior 
oral agreement; under this section a failure to respond permits 
additional terms to become part of the agreement.215 
Plainly, the conflicting terms stated in the confirmation are not part of the 
contract (though this may not be the case under the proposed revisions to 
Article 2). Rather, a court relies on the tape recordings of the agreement 
as evidence of the value date that was originally agreed to by the Citibank 
and DBS foreign exchange traders. 
In sum, under the latter approach to its application, section 2-207 (2) 
may be equipped to handle the problem of inconsistent confirmations. 
Yet, this resolution begs the question of the repercussions of using such 
confirmations. There is a tension between the statute of frauds (specifi-
cally, section 2-201 (2)) and section 2-207 (2) in the context of the currency 
bazaar: satisfying the former with written confirmations lays the founda-
tion for battle of the forms problems. Such problems are best avoided by 
eliminating confirmations and relying on the tape recording for disposi-
tive evidence of the terms of the dollar-yen transaction. 
D. Linking the Resolutions of the Scope and Enforceability Problems 
The pragmatic strategy links the resolution of the enforceability and 
scope problems. Whether the definition of "goods" in U.C.C. section 2-
105(1) ought to encompass foreign exchange should depend in part on 
213. U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 6. 
214. See, e.g., Luedtke Eng'g Co., Inc. v. Indiana Limestone Co., 740 F.2d 598, 600 (7th 
Cir. 1984); St. Charles Cable 1V, Inc. v. Eagle Comtronics, Inc., 687 F. Supp. 820, 827 
(S.D.N.Y. 1988). 
215. U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 6 (emphasis added). 
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whether the application of the statute of frauds seJVes the needs of foreign 
exchange market participants. As presently constituted and interpreted, it 
does not. The statute of frauds would render unenforceable many foreign 
exchange transactions that should be enforced. The statute may lead to 
problems of parol evidence and the battle of the forms. Therefore, Llew-
ellyn's argument that "after two centuries and a half the statute stands, in 
essence better adapted to our needs than when it was first passed"216 is 
unpersuasive. At least in the context of the foreign exchange market, the 
statute of frauds in U.C.C. Article 2 must be reformed or abolished 
through legislative or judicial action. 
Does this argument necessarily dictate that foreign exchange should 
not be considered a "good"? The argument strongly suggests an affirma-
tive answer. Such an answer, however, would be an overreaction. Thus, 
the Court should reject DBS's response to Citibank's statute of frauds de-
fense. A final resolution of the scope problem depends on more than the 
outcome of the enforceability problem. A complete assessment of other 
significant Article 2 provisions in relation to the needs of the currency 
bazaar is needed. 2I7 
V. ExTENDING THE PRAGMATIC STRATEGY TO OTHER SALEs LAw 
Parts III and IV considered the potential applicability of the U.C.C. to 
the Citibank-DBS dispute chronicled in Part II. This assumption is now 
relaxed. The application of three other sales laws to the scope and en-
forceability problems is considered below: revised U.C.C. Article 2, the 
CISG, and private sales law. Part V argues that the pragmatic strategy can 
be extended to deal with these problems under other sales law regimes. 
A. Current Proposals to Revise U.C.C. Article 2 
One proposed revision would decisively resolve the scope problem by 
excluding all foreign exchange transactions from U.C.C. Article 2. Sec-
tion 2-102(a) (23) of the December 1993 and August 1994 Drafts of revised 
Article 2 defines "goods" as "all things ... that are movable ... [h]owever, 
the term does not include ... foreign exchange transactions."218 Unfortu-
nately, the Reporter's Notes do not indicate why foreign exchange transac-
tions are expressly excluded. There is no suggestion that the exclusion 
reflects a calculated decision that the provisions of revised Article 2 would 
be inapposite to the currency bazaar, though this indeed may be the case. 
Interestingly, the December 1993 and August 1994 Drafts also abolish 
the statute of frauds, thus resolving the enforceability problem. Section 2-
201 states that "[a] contract ... is enforceable whether or not there is a 
216. Karl N. Llewellyn, What Price Contract?-An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE LJ. 704, 747 
(1931). 
217. Such provisions include those relating to contract formation and remedies. See 
Bhala, supra note 74. 
218. U.C.C. § 2-102(a)(23) (Tentative Draft Dec. 21, 1993) (emphasis added). Foreign 
exchange transactions are not excluded from the definition of "goods" in the September 
1993 Draft. 
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writing signed or record authenticated by a party against whom enforce-
ment is sought .... "219 This change-a complete rejection of the tangi-
bility paradigm-would, of course, meet the needs of foreign exchange 
market participants. 
A more radical proposal regarding Article 2 is to revise it according to 
a "hub-and-spoke" model.22° Core rules applicable to all contracts would 
form the hub from which spokes would emanate. The spokes would set 
forth principles designed for special transactions. Conceivably, one spoke 
could apply to foreign exchange transactions. The pragmatic strategy 
could support this radical approach if major provisions of Article 2, in 
addition to the statute of frauds, are not applied to the currency bazaar 
context. 
B. The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods ("CISG") 
A literal reading of Articles 1 ( 1) and 2 (d) of the CISG makes it impos-
sible to argue that the scope of the CISG encompasses foreign exchange 
transactions. Article 1 (1) states that the CISG applies to "contracts of sale 
of goods between parties whose places of business are in different States," 
but Article 2(d) excludes sales of money from the Convention.221 Unlike 
U.C.C. section 2-105(1), Article 2(d) does not distinguish between money 
that is the subject of the contract (the commodity leg) and money that is 
used as payment (the payment leg). CISG Article 2(d) also fails to men-
tion "things in action." 
The crude scope clause in the CISG is unfortunate because the way in 
which the CISG resolves the enforceability problem serves the needs of the 
currency bazaar. There is no statute of frauds in the CISG-here again 
rejecting the tangibility paradigm. Article 11 of the CISG states that "[a] 
contract of sale need not be concluded in or evidenced by writing. "222 
Thus, if the CISG applies to the Citibank-DBS dispute, then Citibank can-
not argue that the dollar-yen contract is unenforceable. Moreover, ques-
tions about tape recordings as evidence of a contract, costs associated with 
written confirmations, and potential difficulties arising under Article 19 of 
219. U.C.C. § 2-201 (Tentative Draft Dec. 21, 1993). The September 1993 Draft contains 
essentially the same revision of Section 2-201 as the December 1993 Draft. 
220. See U.C.C. REv. ART. 2 (Discussion Draft Feb. 10, 1994); Nimmer, supra note 10. 
221. CISG, supra note 13, at 672. The States must be Contracting States (i.e., they have 
ratified or acceded to the CISG), or the applicable choice of law rules must lead to the 
application of the law of a Contracting State. Pursuant to CISG Article 95, the United States 
has taken a reservation to the choice of law provision. See id. at 693; MARTINDALE-HUBBELL, 
supra note 13, at IC35; Smart supra note 13, at 1344-46. Under Article 6, parties are free to 
exclude the application of the CISG. CISG, supra note 13, at 673. 
222. CISG, supra note 13, at 674. However, under CISG Article 96, a state can take a 
reservation to Article 11 if the law of that state provides that contracts must be in writing. /d. 
at 693-94. (Article 96 refers to "legislation" which presumably means that the law must take 
the form of a statute or civil code.) If a party to a sales contract has its place of business in a 
reserving state, then CISG Article 11 is inapplicable. /d. at 674 (Art. 12). Argentina, Belarus, 
Chile, China, Hungary, the Russian Federation, and the Ukraine have taken reservations 
under CISG Article 96 to Article 11. See MARTINDALE-HUBBELL, supra note 13, at IC34 to IC 
35. 
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the CISG (the provision on the battle of the forms) are irrelevant. In sum, 
the CISG's resolution of the enforceability problem strongly suggests that 
the scope of the CISG should cover the Citibank-DBS dispute. 
The literal language of CISG Article 2(d) remains problematic, how-
ever, thus requiring a new judicial interpretation of that Article. For ex-
ample, a court could find that a distinction is implied between commodity 
leg and payment leg monies. Yen are the subject of the contract and 
"goods" for purposes of determining the scope of the CISG. This finding 
is not unprecedented. In In re Midas Coin Co., the court distinguished be-
tween those coins sold as a commodity for numismatic purposes and those 
coins used as a means of payment.223 The Midas court was confronted 
with the definition of "goods." Like the CISG definition, the court noted 
without further elaboration that the term " 'includes all things which are 
movable ... but does not include money.' "224 
Here again, a court that renders a Midas-type decision under the 
CISG may be criticized for engaging in judicial activism or subscribing to 
results-oriented jurisprudence.225 The global nature of the currency ba-
zaar, however, remains. Many foreign exchange transactions cross inter-
national borders.226 The participants in different countries will benefit 
from the lack of a statute of frauds and from certainty that the CISG ap-
plies to their transactions, instead of wondering which country's contract 
law governs. 
C. Private Contract Law 
The outstanding example of private contract law in the currency ba-
zaar is the International Foreign Exchange Master Agreement 
("IFEMA") .227 Strictly speaking, there is no problem of scope under this 
law. Scope is a matter for the parties to decide. Parties can freely enter 
into the master agreement and designate the foreign exchange transac-
tions that they want covered therein. Thus, for instance, Citibank and 
DBS can sign the IFEMA and indicate that it will govern dollar-yen spot 
transactions between their respective New York and Singapore offices.228 
When a dispute arises concerning a transaction governed by the 
IFEMA, the scope problem resurfaces. The dispute must be resolved not 
by the IFEMA, but by interpreting the IFEMA under some other sales law 
regime, whether it be U.C.C. Article 2, revised Article 2, or the CISG. 
223. 264 F. Supp. 193, 197-98 (E. D. Mo. 1967), aff'd sub nom. Zuke v. St. Johns Commu-
nity Bank, 387 F.2d 118 (8th Cir. 1968). The application of Article 2 to such transactions is 
not controversial. See, e.g., Morauer v. Deak & Co., 26 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1142 
(D.C. Super. Ct. 1979) (applying Article 2 to the sale of gold and silver foreign coins). 
224. Midas, 264 F. Supp. at 195 (citing Mo. ANN. STAT. § 400.9-105(1)(0 (Vernon 1965). 
225. See supra notes 160-66 and accompanying text. 
226. See supra note 18. 
227. See IFEMA, supra note 14. 
228. Alternatively, they could specify that the IFEMA governs spot transactions in all cur-
rencies between these two offices, spot transactions between multiple offices of Citibank and 
DBS, or some other category of transactions and offices. 
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Therefore, the IFEMA does not necessarily afford the parties certainty as 
to whether their transactions are enforceable. 
The utility of the pragmatic approach again becomes evident; 
whether a particular sales law should govern the disputed transaction 
should depend on whether that law meets the needs of the parties. The 
IFEMA expressly states that in the event of a dispute between the parties as 
to the terms of their transaction, the tape recording is "the preferred evi-
dence" of the terms, "notwithstanding the existence of any writing 
[namely, the IFEMA] to the contrary."229 This provision, which states that 
market participants signing the IFEMA agree in writing to be bound by a 
tape recording, parallels the criterion from Ellis Canning Co. v. Bemstein.230 
Accordingly, if the Bernstein holding is adopted by the Court in the Ci-
tibank-DBS dispute, then those parties may be afforded greater certainty 
as to the enforceability of their foreign exchange trades. 
Regardless of the IFEMA applicability, the disputed dollar-yen trans-
action would be enforceable under either revised Article 2 or the CISG 
because a statute of frauds is absent under both regimes. This result sug-
gests that including foreign exchange transactions governed by the IFEMA 
within the scope of revised Article 2 or the CISG would support market 
needs. A different result is reached with respect to U.C.C. Article 2. A 
court may feel compelled to accept Citibank's defense that the IFEMA 
does not satisfy the minimal writing requirements of section 2-201(1). It 
certainly qualifies as a "writing" under section 1-201 (46) and is "signed" 
according to section 1-201(39).231 Uncertainty remains, however, as to 
whether the IFEMA must state the quantity of currency purchased, and if 
so, whether the IFEMA meets that requirement. 
Arguably, the statute of frauds does not require that a writing state a 
quantity term, because there is no reference to such a term in section 2-
201. Moreover, official comment 1 to U.C.C. section 2-201 indicates that 
"[a]ll that is required is that the writing afford a basis for believing that the 
offered oral.evidence rests on a real transaction." A liberal construction 
suggests that a quantity term is not essential for the establishment of an 
enforceable contract.232 If true, then all of the transactions covered by 
the IFEMA are enforceable. 
229. IFEMA, supra note 14, § 8.3. 
230. 348 F. Supp. 1212, 1228 (D. Colo. 1972). 
231. An interesting question arises as to whether the IFEMA is nothing more than a mani-
festation of intent to enter into a contract or is the contract itself. 
232. See Caroline N. Brockel, The Weed and the Web: Section 2-201's Corruption of the U.C.C. s 
Substantive Provision - The Quantity Problem, 1983 U. ILL. L. REv. 811 (1983). Professors 
White and Summers adopt a similar approach: "a close reading of Section 2-201 indicates 
that all commentators may be wrong. An alternative interpretation is that only if the writing 
states a quantity term is that term determinative." WHITE & SuMMERS, supra note 53, at 76 
n.12; see also American Original Corp. v. Legend, Inc., 652 F. Supp. 962, 966 (D.Del. 1986) 
(finding that the word "all" is sufficient to create an output contract under the statute of 
frauds and that parol evidence may be admitted to ascertain the exact amount); Riegel Fiber 
Corp. v. Anderson Gin Co., 512 F.2d 784, 789 n.ll (5th Cir. 1975) (stating that under the 
White and Summers reading, if a quantity term is present, then it controls, but if no quantity 
term is contained in the writing, then the party seeking enforcement of the agreement can 
establish the term by parol evidence). 
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This construction, however, conflicts with the plain meaning of a dif-
ferent passage from the same official comment: "The only term which 
must appear is the quantity term which need not be accurately stated but 
recovery is limited to the amount stated. "233 In the context of the cur-
rency bazaar, the "quantity term" refers to the amount of currencies 
bought or sold. Yet, parties sign the IFEMA before negotiating or con-
cluding any particular spot transaction. The IFEMA cannot predetermine 
how many yen Citibank purchases from DBS in a particular transaction.234 
Consequently, no master agreement can be effective against Citibank's 
statute of frauds defense.235 
VI. CoNcLusiON 
Private contract law does not resolve the problems of scope and en-
forceability. It simply leads judges, regulators, and market participants 
back to U.C.C. Article 2, revised Article 2, or the CISG. With respect to 
Article 2, absent legislative modification or judicial re-interpretation, the 
statute of frauds and associated tangibility paradigm are inimical to the 
technology and business practices of the currency bazaar. This fact is 
strong, but not conclusive, evidence that including foreign exchange 
transactions in the scope of Article 2 is at variance with the needs of mar-
ket participants. Thus, the pragmatic strategy suggests that Citibank's de-
fense under the statute of frauds should be rejected. It indicates that 
DBS's response to that defense, while perhaps an over-reaction, has merit. 
With respect to revised Article 2 and the CISG, the pragmatic strategy 
suggests that it may be appropriate to include the foreign exchange trans-
actions in the scope of these regimes. They properly reject the tangibility 
paradigm. Because these sales laws omit a statute of frauds, neither re-
vised Article 2 nor the CISG renders important transactions in the global 
currency bazaar, like the Citibank-DBS dollar-yen deal, unenforceable. 
233. U.C.C. § 2-201 cmt. 1. The same requirements for a writing apply to§ 2-201(1) and 
(2). To be sure, the official comment is deceptively simple. In effect, more may be required 
in a writing in order to satisfy the statute offrauds. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 159, § 6. 7, at 
409 (stating that the identity of the parties and the nature, subject matter, and the essential 
terms of the contract must be expressed). 
234. Indeed, there is no separate quantity clause in the IFEMA. The definition of "FX 
Transaction" refers to a transaction between the parties "of an agreed amount" of one cur-
rency in exchange for another currency. IFEMA, supra note 14, § 1, at 4. Section 3.1 dis-
cusses the obligation of each party to deliver an "amount" of currency. /d. at 7. 
235. The uncertainty is compounded by the fact that, assuming a quantity term is re-
quired, it is not clear what types of phrases constitute a "quantity term." At one extreme is a 
general quantity clause such as "a quantity of yen to be determined." The polar opposite is a 
specific quantity term, such as "120 million yen." The issue in choosing these alternatives (or 
some intermediate language) is whether to adopt "a mechanical construction of the quantity 
language of section 2-201 (1 )." Brockel, supra note 174, at 815. For example, a mechanical 
construction is used in New York. See Int'l Commercial Resources, Ltd. v. Jamaica Pub. SeiV. 
Co., 612 F. Supp. 1153, 1155 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding that even though the total dollar 
amount of a transaction was established, a writing that referred to "various goods that [de-
fendant) intends to purchase" and "various material and equipment" lacked a quantity term 
and, therefore, did not satisfy the statute of frauds) (citations omitted). 

